

## **LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN'S AESTHETICS**

---

ZOFIA ROSIŃSKA

The introduction to Leopold Blaustein's (1905–1944) two essays in this issue of *Estetika* contains a general biographical note about the author and his philosophical affiliations, as well as a brief description of his particular interests within philosophical aesthetics. Blaustein's method of philosophical inquiry is described as analytical phenomenology. Three interconnected fields of aesthetics in Blaustein's works are emphasized: the theory of aesthetic perception, the theory of attitudes (towards the imaginary world and the reproduced one) and the theory of representation, especially the imaginary representation crucial for aesthetic perception. Blaustein's theory of perception and aesthetic experience is discussed in greater detail in the introduction as well as represented by the essay 'The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience'. His theory of imaginary representation is exemplified by a selection from his important book *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* (Imaginary representations, 1930). The introduction ends with an account of the idea of 'experiential unity of a higher order', which for Blaustein serves as the condition for the possibility of aesthetic experience and constitutes an important background for an understanding of Blaustein's aesthetics.

Leopold Blausteins Ästhetik

Die Einführung zu Leopold Blausteins (1905–1944) zwei Essays enthält sowohl einen allgemeinen biographischen Abriss zum Autor und zum Kontext seiner Philosophie als auch eine Skizze seiner Hauptinteressen auf dem Gebiet der philosophischen Ästhetik. Blausteins philosophische Methode wird als analytische Phänomenologie charakterisiert. Darin werden drei miteinander verknüpfte Felder der Ästhetik hervorgehoben: die Theorie der ästhetischen Wahrnehmung, die Theorie der Einstellung (zur imaginierten und zur reproduzierten Welt) und die Theorie der Vorstellung, v.a. Einbildungsvorstellung, die für die ästhetische Wahrnehmung entscheidend ist. In der Einleitung wird Blausteins Theorie der Wahrnehmung und ästhetischen Erfahrung eingehender diskutiert. Sie wird auch im Essay „Die Rolle der Wahrnehmung in der ästhetischen Erfahrung“ präsentiert. Seine Theorie der Einbildungsvorstellung wird anhand einer Auswahl aus seinem bahnbrechenden Buch *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* (Einbildungsvorstellungen, 1930) vorgestellt. Die Einführung endet mit einer Darstellung der Idee der „Erfahrungseinheit höherer Ordnung“, die Blaustein zufolge die Bedingung der Möglichkeit ästhetischer Erfahrung ist, vor deren Hintergrund seine Ästhetik verständlich wird.

Leopold Blaustein had no students or biographers and no tributes were made to him. All that remains is a couple of recollections of friends and teachers, some basic information, and a few critical analyses of his philosophical

work.<sup>1</sup> Yet his meticulous analyses of aesthetic objects and experiences with respect to different modes of perception and the different media through which aesthetic objects are presented to a perceiver resulted in original aesthetic ideas and distinctions that are only now beginning to be recognized by aestheticians. Most of the current interest is on his innovative media aesthetics which, despite the state of the technology of the days in which he was writing his seminal works, is still relevant.<sup>2</sup> Blaustein's description of the specificity of media experience is, however, based on his general phenomenological reflections on aesthetic perception and the constitution of imaginary objects. Consequently, the starting point of any account of his theory should be aesthetic perception and aesthetic experience.

The story of Leopold Blaustein's life is full of question marks and qualifiers like 'maybe', 'perhaps', 'probably'. He was born in 1905. He was murdered (reportedly with his wife Eugenia and his son) by the Nazis in the Lvov Ghetto (or in a concentration camp nearby) in 1942. According to another version, he committed suicide in Lvov in 1943 or 1944.<sup>3</sup>

He was a student in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Lvov, probably between 1923 and 1927.<sup>4</sup> He attended the seminars of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School of Logic, and attended lectures by

<sup>1</sup> Of the few critical accounts of Blaustein's aesthetics, see, for example, Roman Ingarden, 'Leopold Blaustein: Teoretyk radia i filmu' [Leopold Blaustein: Radio and film theorist], *Zeszyty Prasoznawcze*, no. 4 (1963): 86–93, and also Ingarden's 'Leopold Blaustein', *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 42 (1946): 335–36. His correspondence with Kazimierz Twardowski is an important source for an historical account of the intellectual development of the Lvov-Warsaw school as well as the individual thought of both philosophers. See Ryszard Jadczyk, 'Uczeń i nauczyciel: Z listów Leopolda Blausteina do Kazimierza Twardowskiego z lat 1927–1930' [Disciple and master: The correspondence between Leopold Blaustein and Kazimierz Twardowski 1927–30], in ...*A mądrości zło nie przemoże* [...But vice shall not prevail against wisdom], ed. Jacek J. Jadacki and Barbara Markiewicz (Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, 1993), 19–27.

<sup>2</sup> See especially Leopold Blaustein, 'Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques', *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* 11 (1939): 5–61, and *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [On the psychology of the cinematic spectator], Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Psychologiczne, 1933. For more on this, see Zofia Rosińska, *Blaustein: Koncepcja odbioru mediów* [Blaustein: A conception of media reception] (Warsaw: Prószyński, 2001), which also includes twelve essays by authors applying Blaustein's theories to contemporary media. See also Blaustein's remarks on the experience of theatrical and cinematic representations in 'Imaginary Representations: A Study on the Boarder of Psychology and Aesthetics', § 25, published in this issue of *Estetika*. Another field of Blaustein's work is education, but his essays in this area are generally less valuable these days than his media theory and aesthetics, with the exception of *Wpływ wychowawczy filmu* [The educational influence of film] (Lvov: Malinowski, 1937).

<sup>3</sup> Jacek J. Jadacki, 'Życiorysy niedokończone' [Unfinished biographies], in Jadacki and Markiewicz, ...*A mądrości zło nie przemoże*, 161.

<sup>4</sup> Jadczyk, 'Uczeń i nauczyciel', 19.

Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, another prominent figure of that school, and the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden. In 1925 he spent a semester at Freiburg as a student of Edmund Husserl.<sup>5</sup>

On 4 July 1927, Blaustein received his PhD. His thesis, supervised by Twardowski, is entitled 'Husserl's Theory of the Act, the Content, and the Object of Representation'.<sup>6</sup> Shortly before the viva voce, on 19 May 1927, he had also to pass a two-hour oral exam (*rigorosum*). His examiners were Twardowski and Juliusz Kleiner, a literary theorist. Blaustein passed with flying colours. He was only 22 or 23 years old when he graduated, which was uncommon at the time and in the circle of Twardowski's students.

He wrote little, perhaps only a few hundred pages in all, since his life was cut short at the age of 38. He considered himself a philosopher or psychologist rather than an aesthetician, but his achievements in philosophical aesthetics deserve more interest than they have so far received.<sup>7</sup> His most important works on aesthetics include *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* (1930),<sup>8</sup> *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne* (1931),<sup>9</sup> 'O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki'

<sup>5</sup> Blaustein was impressed by Husserl, but cannot be considered his follower. Both men were phenomenologists, but they took different approaches to philosophy. See Leopold Blaustein, 'Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia' [Edmund Husserl and his phenomenology], *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 5 (1930): 233–42. In his doctoral thesis, Blaustein engaged in polemics with Husserl, indicating several points of disagreement. These do not, however, directly concern questions of aesthetics. For the relationship between Blaustein's phenomenology and the Lvov-Warsaw School and Twardowski, see Wioletta Miśkiewicz, 'Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology', in *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy*, ed. Sandra Lapointe, Mathieu Marion, Wioletta Miskiewicz, and Jan Woleński (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 181–88.

<sup>6</sup> Jadczak, 'Uczeń i nauczyciel', 20. The thesis was published a year later by the Lvov Scientific Society as *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia* [Husserl's theory of the act, the content, and the object of representation] (Lvov: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1928).

<sup>7</sup> Dziemidok ranks Blaustein's achievements next to those of Roman Ingarden, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, and Stanisław Ossowski. Bohdan Dziemidok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego* [Theories of aesthetic experience and value in Polish aesthetics of the interwar period] (Warsaw: PWN, 1980). For a general assessment of his aesthetics, see Zofia Rosińska, 'Leopold Blaustein: Styk psychologii i estetyki' [Leopold Blaustein: The junction of psychology and aesthetics], in *Wybór pism estetycznych* [Selected essays on aesthetics], by Leopold Blaustein, edited by Zofia Rosińska (Kraków: Universitas, 2005), vii–lii.

<sup>8</sup> *Przedstawienia imaginatywne: Studium z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki* [Imaginary representations: A study on the border of psychology and aesthetics] (Lvov: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, 1930). An abridged version of the book, published as 'Przedstawienia imaginatywne: Studium z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki', in *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40–68, appears in English translation in this issue of *Estetika*.

<sup>9</sup> *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne: Badania z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki* [Schematic and symbolic representations: Research on the border of psychology and aesthetics] (Lvov: Przegląd Humanistyczny, 1931).

(1935–36),<sup>10</sup> 'Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym' (1937),<sup>11</sup> and 'O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych' (1938).<sup>12</sup>

What particularly strikes the reader of Blaustein's essays is his methodological awareness and Cartesian-like attention to detail manifested in his research. He considers the reader to be able to follow the analysis and to assess the results. Every stage of the work is preceded by methodological remarks informing the reader of what Blaustein is about to do and to what end. Blaustein never attempts to conceal the sources of his assumptions either. He formulates his purpose in an essay on the intuition (*naoczność*) of representation thus: 'I am not inquiring into which representations are intuitive; on the contrary, assuming that at least some of them are definitely intuitive, I am seeking to explain what this intuitiveness consists in.'<sup>13</sup> A question arises here, of course, of how we can know that at least some of representations are definitely intuitive? To answer this, Blaustein turns to psychology – 'it is a unanimous belief of psychologists' – and the purpose of his analysis 'is to bring to light the factors that are responsible for this common, intuitive belief of psychologists'.<sup>14</sup> Blaustein does not claim that his theory of aesthetic perception and aesthetic experience, as well as the constitution of the object of aesthetic experience, can be indisputably proven from beginning to end. He makes explicit some assumptions and attempts to shed some light on them; the expansion of knowledge is the expansion of consciousness. This attitude is characteristic of all his works; he intuitively achieves something and then attempts to conceptualize it, while treating knowledge attained this way as certain.

<sup>10</sup> 'O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki' [On the imaginary world of art], in *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 128–35. Originally published in *Miesięcznik Literatury i Sztuki* 2 (1935–36): 243–49.

<sup>11</sup> 'Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym' [The role of perception in aesthetic experience], in *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 136–44. Originally published in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 40 (1937): 399–408, it appears in translation in this issue of *Estetika*.

<sup>12</sup> 'O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych' [On the apprehension of aesthetic objects], in *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 3–19. Originally published as *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych* (Lvov: Polska Biblioteczka Pedagogiczna, 1938). Three of Blaustein's essays on aesthetic subjects originally appeared in foreign languages: Blaustein, 'Étude sur la perception'; *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen* (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1929); and 'Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise', in *Actes du deuxième congrès international d'esthétique et de science de l'art*, vol. 1 (Paris: Alcan, 1937), 245–49. There also exists a Russian edition of Blaustein's three works (*Husserlowska nauka; Przedstawienia imaginatywne; Przewstawienia schematyczne*): Leopold Blaustein, *Izbrannyye sochineniya* [Selected works], ed. and trans. Boris Dombrovsky (Moscow: DIK, 2002).

<sup>13</sup> Leopold Blaustein, 'O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień' [On intuition as a property of some representations], in *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 24. Originally published in *Księga Pamiątkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego* (Lvov: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, 1931), 120–42.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

Blaustein generally focuses on trying to understand the activity of perception, which is situated on the borderline between the real world and the world of art, the given world and the created one. In other words, he wants to understand the processes that occur at the junction of psychology and aesthetics, but it is not his intention to reduce those processes to psychology. In other words, he does not want to reduce analyzed phenomena to an empirical description of psychological processes. While not allowing himself the metaphorical description, he endeavours to develop an objective language with which to describe aesthetic experience understood not as passive reception but as actively shaping its object. When we experience aesthetically, he writes, we 'live in the moment'<sup>15</sup> not in the past or the future. Aesthetic experiences 'break the mainstream of our mental life connected to the struggle for survival or for vital resources'.<sup>16</sup> This does not mean that they are idle or passive perceptions. On the contrary, 'even in perceptual processes, in which it seems we only passively receive the aesthetic object, the activity of the person experiencing aesthetically is manifested'.<sup>17</sup> While experiencing a work of art the active element is imaginative perception. What is characteristic of imaginative perception is the possibility of switching attitudes amongst the represented, the representing, and the imaginary objects. This makes it possible for us to perceive the quantity and quality of aesthetic values which depend not only on the properties of an object, but also on the course of our perception. 'It seems,' concludes Blaustein, 'that only in the perception of the object in all three attitudes, obviously with the predominance of the attitude to the imaginary object, can the imaginative work of art manifest itself to us in the fullness of its aesthetic qualities and values.'<sup>18</sup>

Blaustein believed that aesthetic experience demands an extroverted attitude, which means that we should be predisposed towards the work of art, as opposed to an introverted attitude, in which we treat the work of art as a means to evoke feelings that are in that case a direct object of our enjoyment. Lastly, I would point out that Blaustein introduced, although never fully developed, a category of the 'intersubjective imaginary object'. If fully developed, the notion of the intersubjective imaginary object would provide theoretical grounds for a new understanding of how cultural communities are created and function.

Blaustein's aesthetics is difficult to summarize. It is not one of many narratives which can be accepted or rejected and substituted for by some other narrative

<sup>15</sup> Blaustein borrowed the expression 'living in the moment' from the Polish sociologist and aesthetician Stanisław Ossowski.

<sup>16</sup> Blaustein, 'O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych', 3.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

better suited to one's subjective preferences. Rather his aesthetics aspires to an objective, scientific description of how objects of aesthetic experience are apprehended by the experiencing subject. It is, according to Blaustein, a cognitive effort based on psychological data and one's own insight subjected to critical analysis. For this reason we can usefully characterize Blaustein's *oeuvre* as analytic phenomenology. In his description of aesthetic experience he avoids metaphors, symbols, and interpretations based on free association. It does not follow, however, that he disregards the value of such descriptions. But, as he says, he leaves them to aestheticians, by which he means art critics. He himself, as a phenomenologist, was interested in the description of the way the mind works when experiencing art.

In Blaustein's aesthetic theory, one may distinguish three interconnected fields. The first is his theory of aesthetic perception and the distinction between observative, imaginative, and signitive perception, all three occurring in aesthetic experience but in relation to different kinds of aesthetic objects.<sup>19</sup> The second area is a theory of attitudes (towards an imaginary world and a reproduced one). The distinction between the attitude towards an imaginary world and a reproduced world is illustrated, for example, in 'Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques', where Blaustein, in order to explain the specificity of a radio play as compared to a news report or other form of radio programme, states that the difference is in the attitude of the radio-play listener, who, while hearing sounds such as a telephone ringing or a crowd cheering a king, does not locate them in any real, spatiotemporal world, but treats them as representing something else in the imaginary world. In that sense, 'not only people but also inanimate objects bec[o]me actors'.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, this attitude to the imaginary, but not the reproduced, world is the condition of aesthetic experience – which is an instance of an experiential unity of a higher order, a point to which I shall return later in this introduction.

The third area of interest is Blaustein's theory of representation, among which imaginary representations are crucial to aesthetic perception. As Blaustein remarked in his short essay 'On the Imaginary World of Art', 'there are as many [imaginary] worlds as there are paintings, photographs, films, and so forth'.<sup>21</sup> In order to express more clearly the idea of what an imaginary representation is in contrast to, on the one hand, the reproduced object and, on the other, the reproducing one, Blaustein gives the following example: 'When I look at ten photographs of a person known to me, I have ten reproducing objects in front of

<sup>19</sup> For more on this, see Blaustein, 'Role of Perception'.

<sup>20</sup> Blaustein, 'Étude sur la perception', 11.

<sup>21</sup> Blaustein, 'O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki', 130.

me, by means of which I apprehend ten imaginary objects but only one reproduced object.<sup>22</sup> Representation is understood by Blaustein as ‘a special, simple, intentional mental act with two interdependent components: quality and matter’.<sup>23</sup> Representations have intended objects, which can be reproduced, or imaginary, depending on the attitude of the perceiver, as we have seen.

In Blaustein’s aesthetic theory an ‘experiential unity of a higher order’ (an expression he borrowed from humanistic psychology) serves as the condition for the possibility of any aesthetic experience as well as any creative activity.<sup>24</sup> And even though Blaustein did not state this explicitly, it would not be possible to describe aesthetic experience the way he did if the idea of those unities, psycho-spiritual structures, had not been previously developed. Aesthetic experience is one of this unity’s modes.<sup>25</sup> The experiential unity of a higher order is isolated from what Blaustein calls ‘originally natural psychological unity’, that is, the psychological entirety of a person’s life, from birth to death. A unity of a higher order is characterized by *continuity*, an *intentional* relation to certain objects, a *teleological* character, *genetic* relations between the individual experiences constituting it, and, lastly, *dependence* on a mental and extra-mental constellation.<sup>26</sup>

*Continuity* as one of the defining characteristics of the unity of a higher order consists in the fact that experiences that belong to that unity do not disappear after a break but continue as if there were no break. The example given by Blaustein is a translator who takes a break from his work to read a newspaper and later returns to work without any disruptions.<sup>27</sup> *Intentional* relation refers to the fact that the experiencing subject intends a series of objects of experience as something unified (for example, a theatrical performance is a unity even though it consists in a series of experienced objects). The *teleological* character of this experiential unity manifests itself in its serving, consciously or not, some definite purpose, such as happiness, power, knowledge, or aesthetic experience, and its structure being governed by this purpose. *Genetic* relations between experiences refer to the fact that phases of the experiential unity remain under the influence of the same purpose, even if distant in time. For example, a person in love remains under the spell of this feeling even after having carried out a task

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 134. For more detail, see Blaustein, ‘Imaginary Representations’.

<sup>23</sup> Blaustein, ‘Imaginary Representations’, § 1.

<sup>24</sup> For his account of humanistic psychology, see Leopold Blaustein, ‘O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej’ [On the tasks of humanistic psychology], *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 38 (1935): 33–57.

<sup>25</sup> See Blaustein, ‘Role of Perception’.

<sup>26</sup> This conception is further developed in Blaustein, ‘O zadaniach’.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 9.

that has considerably taxed his mental powers.<sup>28</sup> The last feature, *dependence* on the mental and the extra-mental constellation, emphasizes that experiential unities of a higher order are not entirely autonomous, since they are influenced by social and biological factors.

To sum up: in his model of aesthetic experience Blaustein uses phenomenological categories and attempts to apply them to describe aesthetic experience. His own particular contribution is the notion of imaginary representation, which is characterized by the ability to shift attitudes from one that is towards the representing object to one that is towards the represented object and imaginary object, and the other way round. Acknowledging the possibility of this shift as an essential feature of aesthetic experience prompts us also to acknowledge the importance of the boundary between the real and the imaginary: the boundary may sometimes be crossed but it cannot be eradicated, since its elimination would also do away with the possibility of a shift and, in consequence, would make aesthetic experience impossible, for aesthetic experience is essentially receptive-creative.

Zofia Rosińska  
Institute of Philosophy,  
Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Warsaw,  
ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland  
z.w.rosinska-zielinska@uw.edu.pl

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

### PRIMARY SOURCES

Blaustein, Leopold. *Izbrannye sochineniya* [Selected works]. Edited and translated by Boris Dombrovsky. Moscow: DIK, 2002.

Blaustein, Leopold. *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia* [Husserl's theory of the act, the content, and the object of representation]. Lvov: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1928.

----- . *Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen*. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1929.

----- . 'Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia' [Edmund Husserl and his phenomenology]. *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 5 (1930): 233–42.

----- . *Przedstawienia imaginatywne: Studium z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki* [Imaginary representations: A study on the border of psychology and aesthetics]. Lvov: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, 1930. Abridged edition, 'Przedstawienia imaginatywne: Studium z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki', in Blaustein, *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 40–68.

---

<sup>28</sup> Blaustein's own example in *ibid.*, 41.

- , 'O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień' [On intuition as a property of some representations]. In *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 20–39. Originally published in *Księga Pamiątkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego*, 120–42. Lvov: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, 1931.
- , *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne: Badania z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki* [Schematic and symbolic representations: Research on the border of psychology and aesthetics]. Lvov: Przegląd Humanistyczny, 1931.
- , *Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego* [On the psychology of the cinematic spectator]. Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Psychologiczne, 1933.
- , 'O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej' [On the tasks of humanistic psychology]. *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 38 (1935): 33–57.
- , 'O imaginatywnym świecie sztuki' [On the imaginary world of art]. In *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 128–35. Originally published in *Miesięcznik Literatury i Sztuki* 2 (1935–36): 243–49.
- , 'Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise.' In *Actes du deuxième congrès international d'esthétique et de science de l'art*, 1:245–49. Paris: Alcan, 1937.
- , 'Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym' [The role of perception in aesthetic experience]. In *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 136–44. Originally published in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 40 (1937): 399–408.
- , *Wpływ wychowawczy filmu* [The educational influence of film]. Lvov: Malinowski, 1937.
- , 'O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych' [On the apprehension of aesthetic objects]. In *Wybór pism estetycznych*, 3–19. Originally published as *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych*. Lvov: Polska Biblioteczka Pedagogiczna, 1938.
- , 'Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques.' *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* 11 (1939): 5–61.
- , *Wybór pism estetycznych* [Selected essays on aesthetics]. Edited by Zofia Rosińska. Kraków: Universitas, 2005.
- , 'Imaginary Representations: A study on the Border of Psychology and Aesthetics.' Translated by Monika Bokinieć. *Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics* 48 (2011): 209–34.
- , 'The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience.' Translated by Monika Bokinieć. *Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics* 48 (2011): 235–43.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

- Dziemidok, Bohdan. *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego* [Theories of aesthetic experience and value in Polish aesthetics of the interwar period]. Warsaw: PWN, 1980.
- Ingarden, Roman. 'Leopold Blaustein.' *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 42 (1946): 335–36.
- , 'Leopold Blaustein: Teoretyk radia i filmu' [Leopold Blaustein: Radio and film theorist]. *Zeszyty Prasoznawcze*, no. 4 (1963): 86–93.
- Jadacki, Jacek J. 'Życiorysy niedokończone' [Unfinished biographies]. In Jadacki and Markiewicz, ... *A mądrości zło nie przemoże*, 159–80.
- Jadacki, Jacek J., and Barbara Markiewicz, eds. ... *A mądrości zło nie przemoże* [...And evil will not defeat wisdom]. Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, 1993.
- Jadczak, Ryszard. 'Uczeń i nauczyciel: Z listów Leopolda Blausteina do Kazimierza Twardowskiego z lat 1927–1930' [Disciple and master: The correspondence between Leopold Blaustein and Kazimierz Twardowski 1927–1930]. In Jadacki and Markiewicz, ... *A mądrości zło nie przemoże*, 19–27.

Miśkiewicz, Wioletta. 'Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology.' In *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy*, edited by Sandra Lapointe, Mathieu Marion, Wioletta Miskiewicz, and Jan Woleński, 181–88. *Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science* 16. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009.

Rosińska, Zofia. *Blaustein: Koncepcja odbioru mediów* [Blaustein: A conception of media reception]. Warsaw: Prószyński, 2001.

———. 'Leopold Blaustein: Styk psychologii i estetyki' [Leopold Blaustein: The junction of psychology and aesthetics]. In *Wybór pism estetycznych* [Selected essays on aesthetics], by Leopold Blaustein, edited by Zofia Rosińska, vii–lii. Kraków: Universitas, 2005.

# LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN: IMAGINARY REPRESENTATIONS: A STUDY ON THE BORDER OF PSYCHOLOGY AND AESTHETICS

---

## INTRODUCTION

The science of representation is one of the most developed branches of descriptive psychology.<sup>1</sup> Owing to the development of a series of new concepts, it worked out a subtle conceptual apparatus enabling the description of more than one previously unnoticed state of affairs. Nevertheless, it still contains many untouched or insufficiently explained problems. The descriptions below are devoted to one of those problems – namely, certain kinds of representation whose particular nature only becomes apparent when this new conceptual apparatus is applied in analysis. Imaginary representations – the name I give to the representations in question – do not carry much practical meaning, at least in comparison to perceptual images. Without the examination of imaginary representations, however, it is impossible to conceive of the psychology of a member of the audience in the cinema or the theatre, or the psychology of anyone finding delight in the visual arts, as well as the psychology of some types of religious experience and so forth. In descriptive psychology they deserve a position equal to that of reproductive and creative images, and because of the circumstances in which these imaginary representations occur their analysis is closely tied to aesthetics.

The descriptions below will only be an introductory contribution to analyses of imaginary representations, and will therefore undoubtedly require refinements in many directions and also far-reaching complements. They will nevertheless fulfil their purpose if they attract the attention of psychologists to this interesting kind of representation. They will be based on conclusions drawn from the structure of representation as analyzed by many prominent scholars. I will therefore first describe them briefly, since this will

---

[*Przedstawienia imaginatywne: Studium z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki* (Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne: Lvov, 1930), 5–63. This essay is included in Leopold Blaustein, *Wybór pism estetycznych* [Selected essays on aesthetics] (Kraków: Universitas, 2005), 40–68. The original bibliographical references have been made to conform with the style and usage of *Estetika*. In-text cross-references to paragraphs not included in the translation have been omitted and a bibliography of cited works has been appended.]

<sup>1</sup> Like prominent experimental psychologists such as Wolfgang Köhler and Max Wertheimer, I do not set experimental psychology in opposition to descriptive psychology. Description and experiment are two methods of one and the same science [...].

prove useful in reconciling the at least partly diverse terminologies used by different scholars, which may wrongly give the impression of chaos.<sup>2</sup>

## I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON THE STRUCTURE OF REPRESENTATIONS

1. Representation is a special, simple, intentional mental act with two interdependent components: quality and matter.<sup>3</sup> The matter of the act can also be understood as its 'mental content'. The mental content of the act is the interdependent part that causes the act to turn towards this and no other object and to apprehend this object as furnished with these and no other properties. The quality of the act is the interdependent part that makes it a representation, not a judgement or feeling. Because of the interdependency of quality and matter, introspection only reveals the unity comprising both, never quality without matter or matter without quality. Nevertheless, a series of still irrefutable arguments formulated by, among others, Twardowski, Meinong, and Husserl<sup>4</sup> inclines us to differentiate between them by means of abstraction. The only serious counterargument is the claim that in introspection the matter of the act is not perceived.

<sup>2</sup> The content of these reflections was sketched in two papers given at the Philosophy Seminar for University Students in Lvov on 15 May 1925, and 21 May 1926, and in a paper given at the First Convention of Polish University Philosophy Clubs, in Warsaw, in September 1927. This essay began to take shape at Professor Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophy Seminar in 1926. For many of the improvements to the essay, I humbly thank Professor Twardowski, Professor Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Roman Ingarden, and my university colleagues.

<sup>3</sup> I am using Husserl's terms here. See Edmund Husserl, 'V. Über intentionale Erlebnisse und ihre "Inhalte"', in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 19.2, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 2 (1921; The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984), 352–532 [Eng. trans.: Edmund Husserl, 'Investigation V: On Intentional Experiences and their "Contents"', in *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, trans. John N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 2001), 77–176]. The same distinction appears in Kasimir Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen: Eine psychologische Untersuchung* (1894; repr. Munich: Philosophia, 1983) [Eng. trans.: Kasimir Twardowski, *On the Content and Object of Presentations: A Psychological Investigation*, trans. Reinhardt Grossmann (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977)] – namely, in the latter paragraphs of that work, and in Alexius Meinong, 'Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung' (1899), in *Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, ed. Rudolf Haller and Rudolf Kindinge (Graz: ADVA, 1969), 377–480 [Eng. trans.: Alexius Meinong, 'On Objects of Higher Order and Their Relationship to Internal Perception', trans. Marie-Louise Schubert Kalsi, in *Alexius Meinong on Objects of Higher Order and Husserl's Phenomenology*, by Marie-Louise Schubert Kalsi (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), 137–208], but with different names ('act' and 'content'). After 1900 this distinction was adopted by many other scholars, for example Stephan Witasek, Paul Ferdinand Linke, and August Messer.

<sup>4</sup> The polemic between Anton Marty (*Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, Halle: Niemeyer, 1908) and his students, for example, Alfred Kastil (*Studien zur neueren Erkenntnistheorie*, Halle: Niemeyer, 1909), rests on a false understanding of Twardowski's argument. Marty himself introduces a conception of content, which is analogous to that of Twardowski's, but under a different name. See Marty, *Untersuchungen*, 410ff.

This argument is, however, founded (a) on the false assumption that the matter of the mental act should be looked for in consciousness as something appearing beside the act, whereas it always appears in the act, inextricably linked to its quality, and (b) on an interpretation that is false because it considers what is given in introspection as a pure quality, thus leading to absurd consequences and making many psychological questions impossible to explain.<sup>5</sup> Lastly, it should be noted that the distinction between the act and the content, as well as the content and the object of representation, has proved to be very fruitful not only in matters of descriptive psychology but also in the study of meanings, epistemology, and so forth.

2. Representation is described as an intentional mental act. That the act is intentional means that it intends, it is directed at some object. I avoid the expression 'intentional relation,' because it is a source of many misunderstandings. A question then arises: Where is the intentionality of the act rooted? In the quality, the matter, or both? The matter of the act cannot be the source of its intentionality. After all, there are, according to many scholars, intentional mental acts that have no particular matter, for example, feelings.<sup>6</sup> I therefore suspect that intentionality must lie in the quality of the act.

The quality of the act is the interdependent part of the act that makes the act turn towards an object and do so in a specific way. Representation, judgement, and so forth are different from each other as regards the quality of the act, that is, the manner in which they turn to their objects, only making it present in the former, accepting or rejecting it in the latter, and so forth. The matter of the act, on the other hand, gives direction to the intention, directing it towards this particular object and making it apprehend this object and not another. In some mental acts, which, according to some scholars, lack their own matter, this task is carried out by the matter of representation, which is the psychological basis for the acts (for example, in experiencing representational feelings), sometimes together with the matter of judgement (for example, in feelings based on belief).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The quality and matter of the act are undoubtedly hypothetical, inferred from direct experiential data in order to explain them. As in the natural sciences, so too in psychology pure description is insufficient unless one is satisfied with metaphors. Hypothetical factors are necessary and useful in descriptive psychology [...].

<sup>6</sup> According to Meinong all mental acts have mental content. See Alexius Meinong, *Über emotionale Präsentation* (1917), in *Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 3, ed. Rudolf Haller and Rudolf Kindinge (Graz: ADVA, 1968), 283–467 [Eng. trans.: Alexius Meinong, *On Emotional Presentation*, trans. Marie-Luise Schubert Kalsi (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972)].

<sup>7</sup> The distinction between representational feelings and feelings based on belief is Meinong's. Witasek developed it further. See Alexius Meinong, *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Wert-Theorie* (1894), in *Meinong Gesamtausgabe*, 3:1–244, and Stephan Witasek, *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik* (Leipzig: Barth, 1904). See also

3. Representation is linked in particular with sensory content (colour, sound, and so forth), primary or secondary (derivative). The complex of these sensations together with formal qualities constitutes the content presenting its intended object to a certain representation. There is therefore a law of psychology stating that as long as they are not representations of mental facts, these representations are accompanied by some intuitive, imaginary elements, that is, some sensory content.

The presenting content of the representation is not identical to its mental content, the matter of the representational act. In some kinds of representations the presenting content that presents the object to us fulfils the function of its *appearance*, but in others, only the function of a *sign*. This second notion of representational content, that is, the presenting content, appears already fully formulated at the beginning of Twardowski's *Zur Lehre*<sup>8</sup> and in Cornelius, and later, for example, in Husserl, Stumpf, Lipps, Kreibig, Błachowski, and Witwicki.<sup>9</sup> This notion of content is shared by the proponents of functional psychology, who recognize intentional acts, and the proponents of phenomenal psychology, who, under Mach's influence, reject acts.

4. The intentional object of representation can be any object in the widest sense of the word. The objects of images, especially of perceptual ones, and often of concepts, are the objects of everyday experience, for example, people, horses, trees, and houses. The question of whether they do possess the properties that we ascribe to them in the matter of our representations, or whether they exist at all, belongs to epistemology and is of no interest to us here, because we are now concerned only with the description of the character and the content of our experiences. The physical object (the set of atoms,

---

Kazimierz Twardowski, 'W sprawie klasyfikacji uczuć' [On the classification of feelings], in *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne* [Philosophical treatises and articles] (Lvov: PWN, 1927), 411.


<sup>8</sup> [Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand*.]

<sup>9</sup> Hans Cornelius, *Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1897); Carl Stumpf, *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen* (Berlin: Königl. Akademie, 1907) and *Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Königl. Akademie, 1907); Theodor Lipps, *Inhalt und Gegenstand: Psychologie und Logik*, Sitzungsberichte der philosophischen-philologischen und der historischen Klasse der Königlichen Bayerischen Akademie 4 (Munich: Königl. Akademie, 1905), *Leitfaden der Psychologie*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1906), and 'Bewusstsein und Gegenstände', in *Psychologische Untersuchungen*, vol. 1, ed. Theodor Lipps (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1907), 1–204; Josef Klemens Kreibig, *Die intellektuellen Funktionen* (Vienna: Hölder, 1909); Władysław Witwicki, *Psychologia do użytku słuchaczy wyższych szkół naukowych* [Psychology for university students], vol. 1 (Lvov: Ossolineum, 1925); Stefan Błachowski, *Nastawienia i postrzeżenia* [Attitudes and perceptions] (Lvov: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, 1917); Husserl, 'Über intentionale Erlebnisse'.

electrons) and the metaphysician's thing-in-itself may be objects of some representations – namely, concepts. They are not, however, intentional objects of our perceptions. The intentional object of imagination should not be identified with appearances either, since that would be contrary to the actual state of affairs. When I see a house, I intend the three-dimensional solid with four walls, but the appearance is not a solid. Nevertheless, the appearance is in a sense the object of my perception if, that is, by the object we understand, as Twardowski sometimes does, only that which is at this moment entirely intuitively given. But such an understanding of an object is a scientific notion achieved by means of reflection usually preceding epistemological reflections. The object of everyday experience, which we usually intend in our perception, is given in the whole system of appearances that reveal themselves to us one by one.

In terms of the intentional object of representation (both imaginary and conceptual) we must also differentiate between the intentional object as such and the intentional object in general, or, in less suitable but more convenient terminology, the formal object and the material one.<sup>10</sup> The formal object of a certain act possesses only those properties I ascribe to it within the matter of this act, while the material object possesses all the properties I ascribe to it in this and other acts.<sup>11</sup> The difference between the material object and the formal object has nothing to do with the difference between the object existing independent of the act and the object existing dependent on the act, and it thus has only a methodical sense, but no ontological value.

5. This state of affairs may be graphically presented as follows:



<sup>10</sup> These terms are used by Adolf Pfänder ('Logik', *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und fenomenologische Vorschung* 4 (1921): 139–494 [Eng. trans.: Adolf Pfänder, *Logic*, trans. Donald Ferrari (Frankfurt am Main: Ontos, 2009)]) and Roman Ingarden ('Essentielle Fragen: Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Wesens', *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und fenomenologische Vorschung* 7 (1925): 125–304), but not in the sense I have in mind here.

<sup>11</sup> See Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand*, 83 [Twardowski, *On the Content and Object*, 78–79], which contains an early version of this distinction; Husserl, 'Über intentionale Erlebnisse', 414 [Husserl, 'On Intentional Experiences', 113].

As Twardowski, Husserl, and others have claimed, there may be a relation of correspondence of elements between the matter of the act and the presenting content, between the presenting content and the intentional object as well as between the matter and the intentional object. It is therefore reasonable to speak about the adequacy of the presenting content and the matter as well as the adequacy of the matter or the presenting content and the intentional object. All these relationships can serve as the principles of the division of representations.

6. The philosophical literature includes many other notions connected to the science of representation, which I have not taken into account here because they are irrelevant to our further considerations. Others could undoubtedly contribute to deepening the analysis of imaginary representations, but they still need critical assessment. For example, phenomenologists distinguish many layers, such as the visual object (*Sehding*), on the objective side of representation, that is, on the side of the presenting content and the intentional object, which I do not take into account here for the reason specified above.<sup>12</sup>

7. In Poland, owing to Twardowski, the most popular classification of representations is their division into images and concepts, images into perceptual and secondary, and secondary images into reproductive and creative. If we now consider the principle of this division, we shall see that it is not rooted either in the quality or in the matter of the act of representation. Concerning quality, we may refer to the introspection which states that a reproductive image and a concept are not different in terms of quality. We see no difference in the way in which these two kinds of act each relates to the objects. Both only make the object present. If the difference between perceptual, reproductive, and creative images as well as concepts were in quality, the enumerated kinds of representation would not constitute a homogeneous idiogenic kind of mental act, but in the classification of mental acts each would constitute an equal kind of mental act along with judging, feeling, willing, and so forth. And as far as I know that was not the intention of any of the originators of the current classifications of mental acts. A matter of the act cannot supply the principle of division either, because it is a fact that representations of different kinds can have exactly the same matter, that is to say, I can imagine perceptually and then conceptually the same object, apprehending it in both instances as

---

<sup>12</sup> For detailed analyses of these terms, see my *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia* [Husserl's theory of the act, the content, and the object of representation] (Lvov: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1928), either the historical part, where I discuss, among other things, the ideas of Alois Höfler, Twardowski, Cornelius, and Meinong, or §§ 11, 13, 14, 18, 21, 22, and 24 of the descriptive part and their corresponding remarks in the critical part. [...]

possessing the same properties, that is, through the same mental content. If the principle of division comes neither from matter nor from quality, it has to come from the presenting content or from the intentional object, or from their mutual relations. It should be taken into account, however, that here we have not just one division, but three:

(i) the division of representations into images and concepts; (ii) the division of images into perceptual and secondary; (iii) the division of secondary images into reproductive and creative. The first division is based on different relations between presenting content and intentional object in images and concepts, since in the former presenting content is adequate to the object, whereas in the latter, inadequate.<sup>13</sup> The second division is based on the variety of elements of the presenting content, that is, sensory content (see § 26). The third division is based on the variety of intentional objects in reproductive and creative images. Here is a source of unresolved difficulties. What is important in reproductive images is that their object is apprehended as being identical to the object of some previous representation.

Taking into account all that I have discussed so far, it is fair to say that the generic difference between various kinds of representation is based not on some essential difference in their matter or quality from the matter and quality of other acts, but on the difference in the presenting content or the intentional object, or the mutual relation of this content to this object. When examining the peculiarity of imaginary representations I will therefore direct my attention primarily to their presenting content and intentional object.<sup>14</sup> I shall now examine imaginary representations and then try to develop a classification of representations that includes imaginary representations.

## II. ON INTENTIONAL OBJECTS OF IMAGINARY REPRESENTATIONS

8. Observing paintings or sculptures, watching what is happening 'on' the stage or the screen, looking at a reflection in the mirror or on the surface of the water we imaginatively represent certain objects to ourselves. These examples are all from the visual sphere, to which I will restrict myself here. Analyzing our

<sup>13</sup> In specific meanings of 'concept' this division is wrong, because only elementary mental facts can constitute kinds of representation understood as an elementary mental fact. For instance, so-called 'clear concepts', that is, representations of objects by means of definitions cannot be 'representations' in the strict sense, because representations are elementary intentional acts *sui generis*, whereas clear concepts are complexes of representations, assumptions, or judgements.

<sup>14</sup> Since our considerations will concern mainly the presenting contents (that is, appearances) and intentional objects their result will largely depend on whether one is a functional or phenomenal psychologist.

experiences in such situations we come to the conclusion that in these cases two quite distinct attitudes are possible, as well as two corresponding kinds of imaginary representation. Looking in the mirror I can adopt different attitudes. I can intend either objects that are outside me or my body, or objects that are as if inside the mirror, in some peculiar world manifesting itself in the mirror in front of me. The first attitude is present when, for example, looking in the mirror I realize that my eyes are red, the other, when I jokingly wag my finger at my lookalike, who reciprocates the gesture. In the latter case I do not see myself, but some other man, very similar to me, but not identical. The first attitude comes into play when in the theatre, following the plot of Shaw's *Caesar and Cleopatra*, I think about Caesar, a man who died long ago and about whom I was informed by history. The other attitude comes into play when I think about this Caesar here talking just now to the Sphinx. In the first instance I intend the *reproduced* object, in the other, an *imaginary* one. By and large, the reproduced object can also be perceived, whereas the imaginary object cannot be perceived in the strict sense of the word.<sup>15</sup> We can represent the reproduced object either adequately or quasi-adequately, while the imaginary one only quasi-adequately. The reproduced object can be part of the spatiotemporal, real world around us, while the imaginary cannot. The essential difference between these two attitudes lies in the difference between their intentional objects, as with any attitude in the sphere of representations. We shall now consider imaginary objects, from the objective point of view, taking a closer look at one kind – namely, imaginary objects in the strict sense of the word (see §§ 17, 18, and subsequent §§).

9. Let us now look at the relation between imaginary objects and space and time, beginning with spatial properties and relations. Certainly, imaginary objects are not entirely devoid of these. For example, I look at a picture of a house with three floors, each with a set of windows. It is not only two-dimensional. I can also see the third dimension, because I can clearly see how two of its walls form an obtuse angle towards the inside of the house. There is a bridge in front of it, only partly visible. The house has trees to the left and the right, and behind the trees I can see the roofs of other houses. In the centre, to the left of the house, there are two towers. The higher one is closer to the house, the smaller one is

---

<sup>15</sup> Linke is mistaken in his belief that both real and fictional objects can be perceived. (Imaginary objects are a kind of fictional object.) He offers as proof the perception of fictional movements on the projection screen. See Paul F. Linke, *Die phänomenale Sphäre und das reale Bewusstsein* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1912), 10–12. The source of this false belief is in the conflation of the perception of the presenting content with the imaginary representation of the imaginary object. This will become clearer as my arguments proceed.

more distant. Far into the horizon the city is surrounded by mountains that are undoubtedly higher than the towers. This description is clearly full of space-related expressions. Some objects are higher, and others lower, some are closer, others further, some are to the right, others to the left, and some are in front, others behind the house. Perceived objects appear to me in a similar way. So, this is where the question of the difference arises.

Whenever I perceive the world around me, I only perceive one part of it. There are other imperceptible parts of this world beyond what I can perceive. The part I am able to perceive, in which I exist at the moment, is filled with a larger or smaller number of spatial objects. My body is of course one of these objects. I get bored with the world around me, so I escape from it. After a while I am in a totally different part of it, which is filled with totally different spatial objects. One object in particular was there, however, and must be here too. And that object is my body, which I could not escape from even if I tried. Consequently, my body occupies the central position in the apprehension of any of my spatial relations. Something is behind something else and something is in front of it, something is to the left and something is to the right, depending on the position my body occupies. Describing the scene a moment ago, I stated that the mountains were higher than the city towers. 'On' the picture they are much smaller, though apparently I take into account the fact that they are further *from me* than the towers. But here one thing makes me wonder. If an object is in a spatial relation with another object, in this case my body, it also has to have spatial relations with other objects within the same space as my body. The towers and the mountains are therefore not only in front of me, but are also in front of my chair, to the left of the ashtray and to the right of the clock. I can see the sky above them, and above the sky the ceiling, while below them lies a calendar. It seems so strange and absurd, that I wonder whether I had better abandon the proposition that objects seen by me on a picture while I am looking at it are in any spatial relation to me at all. There is a piece of paper in front of me, which is covered in colours, but the patches of colour that are on this piece of paper are next to each other; nothing is closer or further, none of them is a house, a tower, or a bridge.

10. Indeed, I have found myself in a difficult situation. I have to abandon in this case one of the two propositions in which I believe. I shall either deny that objects filling every piece of space around me and perceived by me are grouped as if around my body or I shall stop believing that an object in a spatial relation with one spatial object also has to be in spatial relations with all other objects. I can, however, find a solution to this problem by applying to imaginary representations what Husserl stated about reproductive and creative ones. That is,

I shall say that this house, the bridge, and the mountains are grouped in front of my body, but not the body that is sitting here on a chair by the desk, but the one that is *projected* onto this world that appears to me while looking at the picture. I am there, but invisible. I can even quite accurately define the place from which I am projecting myself: it is on this side of the bridge that I cannot see, exactly in this place where a photographer or a painter wanting to photograph or paint the objects perceived by me would stand. I am not, or rather my *Sehding* is not, as big there, as I see myself at the moment, but as small as the man standing outside on the street, as small as the tip of the pencil I am writing this with.<sup>16</sup> And that is exactly because I project myself unconsciously, seeing this house as bigger than me, although in comparison to my body sitting here on the chair it is more than a hundred times smaller than me. This body of mine projected on the picture, standing on the invisible side of the bridge, is in no spatial relation to my body sitting here by the desk. And the spatial world in general, in which there are those mountains, houses, and towers, which I see when looking at the picture, is here as an alien, intrusive stranger in the space around me without being in any spatial relation to it. It is neither twenty centimetres from my chair nor 200 miles. If I intended not an imaginary object but a reproduced one, things would be different. I could claim, based on my memory or on knowledge otherwise obtained, that this house is a certain number of miles from me, in Lucerne, just as the towers and mountains around it. We are now concerned with the world of imaginary objects, and there are as many such worlds as there are pictures, photographs, mirror reflections, and so forth, while none of these worlds is in any kind of spatial relation to the one great space in which Lvov and Lucerne both are.

11. Can I state the same two propositions also about singular imaginary objects? Let us use as an example the statue of a young man running. We can clearly see this young man heading in a specific direction, towards some specific aim, but who could place this aim in the spatial world around us? How absurd would it be to claim that he is heading towards, say, the door next to which tickets to the exhibition are sold? This young man is heading towards some place in an imaginary spatial world that is not given to us. The character

<sup>16</sup> My body can split not only 'in two', but also 'in three', and so on, for example, when I look at a photograph of myself while intending an imaginary object. We should in such a case distinguish (a) my body in real space, (b) my body as an imaginary object, and (c) my body projected on my body. (a) is given in perception, (b) in imaginary representation, and (c) *is not given at all, nor can it be*. If I had *created* it in my imagination, *supplementing the imaginary world*, I would have to project my body again, and it would retreat, so to speak, and the fourth body (d) would not be given, and then, because (c) would become the object of creative representation, (d) would be in place of (c), and so on *ad infinitum*.

of his movement points towards some unrealized space, and creates, so to speak, a kind of indicator pointing towards some unrealized imaginary world. What I have in mind of course is a sculpted figure and not the marble that is in the same room as my body. Sculptors must have always felt this difference and that is why they put their sculptures on plinths. It is as if the plinth lifted the sculpted figure above the real space. It performs a function analogous to the frame of a painting or a curtain in the theatre, since raising the curtain perfectly symbolizes the shift from the attitude towards the real world to the attitude towards the imaginary world. The plinth had also always been in use. In more realist-oriented times, its height was reduced but it was never entirely eliminated. Admittedly, it was sometimes substituted for by an imitation rock, but it does not change much about what we have stated here. All in all, we may now claim that in singular imaginary objects with no spatial relation to objects other than their own parts there is no difference *in terms of spatial relations* to collections of such objects.

12. To further demonstrate our thesis on the relation between imaginary objects and space one more thing can be stated. That we feel a gap between imaginary objects and the spatial world we reside in can be further demonstrated by the fact that sometimes consciously and with the use of special means we try to close this gap, to force imaginary objects into the real world, that is, to destroy our more or less conscious feeling of the division between these two worlds. Wax sculptures without plinths in panoramas, as well as panoramas themselves, serve as examples. There are special instruments called 'plastoscopes' designed to hide the frames marking the alienness characteristic of painted objects in relation to our space. Sometimes the painting is hidden behind an opening in the wall (an imitation window) in order to hide the frame. All these means simply fail, and interfere with aesthetic experience. Anyone who has, for example, visited the *Panorama of the Battle of Raclawice* in Lvov can easily tell where the world of imaginary objects begins and the real sand and bushes end. Imaginary objects are somewhere beyond or above our real spatial world. And maybe that is the source of this feeling of elevation above the reality of life in aesthetic experience. Lange, among others, writes about it (*Das Wesen der Kunst*, 1901), mistakenly interpreting the source and consequently the meaning of this feeling.<sup>17</sup>

13. We shall now consider the relationship between imaginary objects and time. This relationship is diverse, depending on the character of the appearance of the imaginary object, since this appearance can be either *static* or *dynamic*

<sup>17</sup> [Konrad von Lange, *Das Wesen der Kunst: Grundzüge einer realistischen Kunstlehre*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Grote, 1901).]

(see § 30). It is static in the observing of paintings, photographs, or sculptures, and dynamic in imaginary representations experienced in the theatre and the cinema, or while observing reflections in the mirror or on the surface of water. Imaginary objects presented to us through static appearances are devoid of movement or change. Nothing is happening within them. Considering again our previous example, we say that these trees surrounding the house are unchangeably green, cars never go over the bridge, and the sky above the city and the mountains is forever sunny. Imaginary objects presented through dynamic appearances are an entirely different case. 'On' the cinema screen, trains rush by, objects change, things happen. And where there is movement, or change, or where something keeps happening, objects are determined temporally, things last and pass, something is earlier, something is later. First, Faust made a pact with Mephistopheles, and only later did he see Gretchen. Many temporal relations therefore exist among imaginary objects presented through dynamic appearances.<sup>18</sup> But do they also share any temporal relation with objects in the time in which we experience our thoughts and feelings, in which our movements take place, in which things around us change? The answer is necessarily negative, since it would be absurd to claim that Hamlet saw the ghost at the same time as the person in the seat next to me in the theatre successively ate three pieces of candy, or that Ursus defeated the aurochs after I had taken off my coat in the cloakroom, but before my friend arrived.<sup>19</sup> I can only say that the *actor* saw the other actor at that moment, or that he made some movements simultaneously with my movements, and so forth. So, on the one hand imaginary objects are temporal, but on the other they are not, because any temporal object is in at least one temporal relationship with every other temporal object, which, as we have seen, does not apply to imaginary objects.

14. A conclusive answer to the question of the temporality of imaginary objects (or fictional objects in general) seems to be more difficult than the question of their spatiality. The seemingly obvious solution of the fictionality of fictional time, or fictional times, is, at least to me, psychologically incomprehensible. The concept of fictional spaces (see §§ 9–11) is clearer and the idea of space that consists of

<sup>18</sup> One of the temporal relations that actually applies to imaginary objects presented by static appearances is the relation of simultaneity. For example, in one of Rubens's paintings two huntsmen simultaneously attack a lion that is at the same time tearing to pieces another huntsman pulled down from his horse. There can also be temporal relations between various parts of a cycle, for example in a triptych.

<sup>19</sup> [Ursus is a character in Henryk Sienkiewicz's novel *Quo Vadis?* (1896). Blaustein is referring here to a film adaptation, of which there were already two in his day: one, from 1912, directed by Enrico Guazzoni, the other, from 1925, by Gabriellino D'Annunzio and Georg Jacoby.]

more than three dimensions is psychologically more probable than the concept of 'one-dimensional' time.<sup>20</sup> It is also difficult to decide whether 'I' performs a function analogical, in terms of the temporality of imaginary objects, to that of the body in terms of their spatiality, that is, whether it is projected in any analogical way. Because of these difficulties we have to leave the question of the temporality of imaginary objects open for now, and settle for a negative statement that imaginary objects are in any case actually in a different time than ours. It is therefore fair to say that they are quasi-temporal objects that behave like temporal objects, even though in fact they are not. If we apply this terminology to the problem of the spatiality of imaginary objects, we can reasonably say that they are quasi-spatial.

15. The result of our considerations that imaginary objects are not temporal or spatial objects in the proper sense of the words might lead us to the further conclusion that they are ideal objects. Such a claim would be fundamentally false.<sup>21</sup> If we intend ideal objects, we apprehend them as absolutely non-temporal and non-spatial. Such objects, unlike quasi-temporal and quasi-spatial ones, cannot be deceptively similar to spatial and temporal objects. Ideal objects *as such* have no properties of spatiality, temporality, quasi-spatiality, or quasi-temporality. Some of them, however, for example, certain kinds of real objects, or imaginary objects, possess these properties in their *content*,<sup>22</sup> whereas imaginary objects possess the properties of quasi-temporality or quasi-spatiality as imaginary objects. They are therefore not ideal objects, but quasi-real ones,<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> See Franz Brentano, *Versuch über die Erkenntnis*, ed. Alfred Kastil (Leipzig: Meiner, 1929), 29ff.

<sup>21</sup> I have specified my standpoint concerning ideal objects, especially general ones, in my lectures entitled 'Towards a Critical Assessment of Phenomenology', at the Philosophical Society, Lvov, on 28 April and on 5 May 1928. My summary of them is published as 'Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii' [Towards a critical assessment of phenomenology], *Ruch Filozoficzny* 11 (1928/9): 164–66.

<sup>22</sup> For the difference between the content of ideal objects and the properties that they have qua ideal objects, see Ingarden, 'Essentiale Fragen', 151.

<sup>23</sup> When he wrote: 'Dieses abbildende Bildobjekt steht weder als seiend noch als nichtseiend, noch in irgendeiner sonstigen Setzungsmodalität vor uns; oder vielmehr, es ist bewusst als seiend, aber als gleichsam-seiend in der Neutralitätsmodifikation des Seins', Husserl probably had in mind the quasi-reality I have just described. See Edmund Husserl, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 3.1, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, vol. 1, *Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* (1913; The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), 252 [Eng. trans.: Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Philosophy and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), 262: 'This depicting picture-Object is present to us *neither as existing nor as not existing*, nor in any other *positional modality*; or, rather, there is consciousness of it as existing, but as quasi-existing in the neutrality modification of being.']. There still remains the problem of whether the thing that Husserl calls *abbildendes Bildobjekt* is identical to imaginary objects. [...] *Abbildende Bildobjekte* seem instead to be the

since we apprehend, for example, the flock of sheep 'on' the screen as being alive (existing), but with the qualification of 'quasi'.

16. Continuing our reflections on imaginary objects of imaginary representations, let us ask whether causal relations between imaginary objects are possible. They are possible only as long as we can find movement, change, and the like, in the given world of imaginary objects. As we have seen, movement, change, and so forth are only found with imaginary objects presented through dynamic appearances. So, only among them can there be causal relations. The walls seen 'on' the screen fall down when rhythmically rammed. These relations will, it needs to be emphasized, be similarly quasi-causal since these objects are quasi-spatial and quasi-temporal. The worlds of imaginary objects can be deceptively similar to our world. All the properties that they possess, except for those they possess as imaginary objects, possess the qualification of 'quasi'.<sup>24</sup>

17. These reflections may give the impression that, as opposed to my earlier statement, I have left the area of psychological description to ontological matters. Such a charge would be unfair. We only seemed to be considering imaginary objects, because imaginary objects exist neither in reality nor in any other way and they were not the actual topic here. By describing them I actually described in an indirect way, through the description of intentional objects, the *matter* of imaginative acts that make us apprehend these fictional objects in this particular way and no other.<sup>25</sup> Hence, a kind of objective examination of acts seemed to me to be the most productive way. It would be difficult to describe the matter of the act other than by describing its respective intentional

---

visual objects (*Sehdinge*) of imaginary objects, which I have not mentioned in this essay because of the obscurity of the notion of *Sehding*. The lack of analyses of *Bildbewusstsein* in Husserl's works does not allow one properly to consider the questions touched upon in this remark.

<sup>24</sup> We could to some extent speak of causal relations, but usually those already inferred, in reference to the imaginary objects presented by static appearances. For example, while looking at a painting depicting Alexander the Great on his deathbed we conjecture the cause of the despair and the sadness of the people around him. It is different, for example, in a triptych, where each painting presents a different phase of the same event.

<sup>25</sup> Perhaps the following analogy, though quite removed, will help to provide a better understanding of this matter. When, in the cinema, I pronounce the judgement that there are several colours on the screen, then my judgement actually refers to real properties of the film stock, not to the properties of the screen, whose colour is always the same. The variety and changeability of the phantoms on the screen have their source in the properties (not perceived by the viewer) of the film stock through which they illuminate the screen. When describing an imaginary object we are in fact describing the intention of an imaginative act determined by its matter similarly to the rays of light falling on the screen through the film stock. The matter of the act, as I shall argue in the next section, is not independent in attributing the object with properties. Rather it depends on the presenting content.

object as such. Consequently, the explanation of the meaning and the source of the 'quasi' qualification that accompanies nearly all properties of the imaginary object must be searched for only amongst of the acts, not in the ontological sphere.

18. If in the matter of, say, my perceptual image I attribute certain properties to its intentional object, then I can ascribe these properties to it explicitly in an appropriate act of judgement, in which I accept it as really existing. In other words, the perceptual image can at any moment become the psychological basis for acts of judgement which declare the object of the perceptual image an existing property, the counterparts of which are already implicitly contained in the matter of the perceptual image. The same can be said about the reproductive images. There is analogical possibility – if certain conditions, whose analysis is beyond the scope of the present essay, are met – also for creative imagination (such as judgements about the past) and for imaginary representations intending *reproduced* objects. But it can never be possible for imaginary representations intending *imaginary* objects, that is, they can never be the psychological basis for acts of judgement in which I would attribute to imaginary objects (as actually existing objects) properties whose counterparts are contained in the matter of an imaginative act. Such an imaginary representation may, however, serve as the psychological basis for an assumption.

19. This fact leads me to believe that the source of the 'quasi' qualification which we find while analyzing imaginary objects lies in the way of attributing properties to the intentional object by the matter of imaginative acts that intend imaginary objects, which differs from other intuitive representations. This statement has implications for the concept of matter. By matter, in accord with many thinkers, we understand the interdependent part of the act that directs intention, that is, makes the act turn towards this particular object and no other, and apprehends it as having such and such attributes. Now it turns out, in view of our analysis of imaginary objects, that matter cannot only attribute the intentional object with various properties, but can also achieve this in several ways. The matter of the perceptual act and the matter of the imaginative act (in the strict sense) can 'attribute' their objects with exactly the same properties but in a different way. The matter of the perceptual act will 'seriously' attribute these properties to its object, whereas the matter of the imaginative act, will only *quasi* do so. We can therefore use the expression 'the quality of matter', but since the term 'quality' already has another use in the science of representation, it is better to speak of a 'mode' of matter. So, by analogy, just as quality can be of different kinds, depending on the way it relates intentionally to the object, so can matter have different modes

depending on the way its properties are attributed to the intentional object. This view is consistent with the thesis that in the act matter is a counterpart of object. Just as the properties of an object have their counterparts in individual components of matter, so its general structure (for example, whether it is a real object or a fictional one) is reflected in the mode of matter, that is, the way it attributes properties to the object of an act. The wide field of the study of the modes of the matter of representational acts opens up here, and could shed some light not only on imaginary representations, but also on schematic, symbolic, and other representations. But I must limit myself to presenting this as a hypothesis for further research. So the source of the *quasi* qualification – when it comes to properties of imaginary objects as well as the reason why imaginary objects cannot form the psychological basis for acts of judgement, in which the object would be apprehended as existing – is a specific modification of the way matter endows the object of the intentional act with attributes whose counterparts are components of the matter.

20. As we have seen, the way in which properties are attributed to the intentional object in imaginary representations in the strict sense is different from other intuitive representations. This view should be modified if in reproductive and creative images the two attitudes described in § 8 apply. I do not want to decide that point here, though I am inclined to deny this possibility in reproductive images. If, however, as regards any kind of representation the two attitudes are possible, what we have said about imaginary representation in the strict sense will apply also to the representations whose intentional objects possess their properties with the *quasi* qualification, that is, quasi-real, quasi-temporal, quasi-spatial, and so forth. Since I am not deciding the question here, I cannot use the property of imaginary objects in the strict sense discussed above as *differentia specifica* for other kinds of representations either. Nor can this property serve as the characteristic feature of all imaginary representations if only because there are also imaginary representations intending reproduced objects.


21. Though I have already touched upon the notion of the reproduced object in § 8, I will discuss it again in order to avoid some easily occurring misunderstandings. Reproduced objects of imaginary representations when looking at portraits, photographs, and so forth require no further explanation, since these objects are, or previously were, actually existing objects, elements of the spatiotemporal real world around us.<sup>26</sup> It would, however, be wrong to

<sup>26</sup> But usually they are not elements of the ordinary world in which we live. This applies to both space and time. If they are, for example, when I look in the mirror, then they are not in the same place as the reproducing objects I am looking at.

suggest that this is a characteristic feature or even a common feature of all reproduced objects. The reproduced object can be intended also when I see a picture of the knight's castle that never existed and was painted by the artist solely from his imagination. A peasant or a child would intend in such a 'naive' way, apprehending images of the strangest monsters as being painted from nature, and believing the most improbable fairy tales or novels. Intending the imaginary objects which we do not apprehend as real and do not place within our space is therefore a privilege of people with a certain level of education, as can be attested, for example, by travellers present at the first film screenings in exotic countries. This is a topic, by the way, meriting experimental research.

These remarks lead us to the realization that the characteristic feature of reproduced objects is the fact that they are apprehended in the matter of imaginative acts as *real* elements of the spatiotemporal world in which they have existed or still exist and in which we live – and here it is irrelevant whether these apprehensions are objective or correct. It should therefore be emphasized that it is enough for reproduced objects to be placed by the imaginative act as actually existing somewhere in real space and sometime in real time, and not necessarily in a precisely defined place and time. I can intend the reproduced object while looking at a photograph depicting the sea even if I do not know which particular sea it is. By naming the intentional objects of the kind we consider to have been 'reproduced' I sought to draw attention to the fact that they are apprehended in the matter of the act as reproduced by the artist in marble, on the canvas, and so forth, but that does not mean this is the actual state of affairs. We are therefore still in the realm of acts, not ontological questions.

22. Concerning the imaginary representations whose intentional object is a reproduced one, a question arises about whether their intending is directed straight through the presenting content to reproduced objects or by means of imaginary objects. It can be graphically presented as follows:



In the second instance the imaginary object plays the role of the representative of the reproduced object. Without answering this question definitively, I only put forward the hypothesis that both are possible. The first possibility does not require further explanation, whereas the second implies a psychologically complicated state of affairs, since the imaginary object can represent the reproduced one only if it were apprehended as such, which would, it seems, require new acts accompanying the simple imaginary representation. This problem is closely connected with the more general problem of 'transitive objects' (*Durchgangsgegenstände*, as Husserl called them), which I will leave aside.

23. One of the questions arising about the objects of imaginary representations is whether we can distinguish within them the formal object and the material object. The answer must be yes. The formal imaginary object has only those properties that the matter of imaginative intention has attributed to it. The material imaginary object possesses all the properties that can be 'ascribed' to it in one or more acts on the basis of its appearance or its appearances. In so far as the matter of the act is adequate to its appearance, that is, it apprehends the object by means of all the properties that can be attributed to it on the basis of its appearance, the formal imaginary object is identical with the material one. If, however, the matter is inadequate to the appearance, the formal imaginary object should be distinguished from the material imaginary object, and the latter is of course much richer in properties than the former. And the material imaginary object is just one, because, as we shall soon see (in § 31), the appearance of imaginary representations unambiguously demarcates the imaginary object for me. Still, it would be difficult to apprehend the material imaginary object in the matter of the imaginative act, if only because it possesses an infinite number of relative properties. Concerning the reproduced object, we can also distinguish between the formal and the material object. The formal reproduced object possesses only the properties which I attribute to it in the matter of a given act, while the material object possesses all the properties I attribute to it in this and other acts. Also, the material imaginary object is quite different from the material reproduced object, since both objects 'dwell' in quite different worlds (though this should not be taken too literally). The material imaginary object cannot therefore be apprehended as the formal object corresponding to the materially reproduced object.

24. As we near the end of our reflections on imaginary representations considered from the objective point of view, I will briefly summarize the most important consequences. With imaginary representations two attitudes are possible. Depending on the attitude, the intentional object will be either imaginary or reproduced. I call imaginary representations intending imaginary objects

'imaginary representations' in the strict sense. They are characterized by the special way in which their matter attributes properties to an object, that is, by the kind of matter. The imaginary object has its properties with the *quasi* qualification – except of course for the properties that it has qua imaginary object.

### III. ON THE PRESENTING CONTENT OF IMAGINARY REPRESENTATIONS

In our reflections we have not yet explained why the two kinds of imaginary representation constitute one class. Our reflections supplied us solely with fragmentary general knowledge about the imaginary representations that will only partly complement the examination of their presenting content in relation to its intentional object and related questions.

25. The moment we turn our attention to the presenting content of imaginary representations we notice that the presenting content of two quite different kinds of objects can perform the function of the appearance of imaginary objects. For the presenting content of imaginary representations experienced when looking at paintings or watching theatrical performances and the presenting content of imaginary representations experienced in the cinema are two different things. In the first instance the role of appearance is played by the presenting content of a canvas or paper surface or the presenting content of a person moving on the stage, whereas in the second instance it is the presenting content of phantoms. A closer look at phantoms will afford us a better understanding of this distinction. When I cover a lamp with pink crêpe paper all the objects in the room will be pinkened, but this colour is not their property and it is not how they are apprehended by me. I can only say that a certain phantom has covered the objects in this room. I shall refer in a similar fashion to the black colouring of the parts of objects that are 'covered' by shadow, because the shadow is also a phantom, just as all the glittering of objects illuminated by bright light is a phantom. All I see on the projection screen is a phantom – the screen is monochromatic but its parts are covered with bright or dark phantoms. It is easy to understand that the whiteness stands in a relationship to the screen, which is different from the blueness that is spread on it in the colour film. The whiteness is its dependent part, and the phantom covers the screen as something alien, with no influence on the whiteness of the screen. The conceptual description of a phantom is redundant here. (We distinguish the phantom from its appearance, because one and the same phantom, for example, the shadow of a tree, may be perceived by different people.) From these examples it is easy to grasp the difference between the non-phantom content presenting to me a figure by Matejko<sup>27</sup> and the phantom

<sup>27</sup> [Jan Matejko (1838–1893), Polish painter famous for scenes from Polish history.]

content (that is, something composed of contents presenting phantoms) presenting to me the love story of Vinicius and Ligia on the screen.<sup>28</sup> Despite this difference, they have something in common that brings them closer together and also closer to the presenting contents of perceptual images, and differentiates them from the presenting content of secondary images. I will now elaborate on this.

26. The presenting content of both perceptual and secondary images is made up of complexes of sensory content, such as colours (with regard to visual images) and formal qualities. The sensory content differs, however, in perceptual images and secondary images. Regarding the latter, it could be doubted whether they have 'sensory' content at all. The difference between the two contents is given in introspection to anyone, though its conceptual apprehension is very difficult. One difference, however, is clear. The sensory contents of perceptual images appear whether we want to perceive them or not; their shape, size, colour, and surroundings are independent from us, and the reasons for their appearance are beyond us. The sensory contents of secondary images are *in principle* devoid of such properties; they are more subjective, and depend on us more, in terms both of their appearance and disappearance and of their size, shape, and colour. This description is of course insufficient. The difference that we look for here – as Twardowski has emphasized – is of a qualitative character and belongs to the fundamental differences known from experience, which are, however, impossible to describe or determine. Nevertheless, we easily realize whether we are dealing with sensory content of a perceptual image or a secondary image (see the lecture notes to my 1908/09 course 'Psychology of Thought'). The sensory content of imaginary representations is no different from the sensory content of perceptual images. So, from the point of view of presenting content, imaginary representations are more closely related to perceptual images than to secondary ones.<sup>29</sup>

27. The peculiar character of sensory contents that constitute the presenting content of the imaginary representation is the reason that the psychological basis of each imaginary representation is perceptual acts.<sup>30</sup> In order for the

---

<sup>28</sup> [Characters in the film adaptation of Sienkewicz's *Quo Vadis?* See note 19.]

<sup>29</sup> Concerning the 'sensory' content of secondary images, it is doubtful whether they are in the same space as we are. Nor are they, as imaginary objects, quasi-spatial, presented to us through sensory content and being in the same space as all other objects of our perceptions. They are, however, undoubtedly in the same time as we are. For Igel's treatment of this topic, see Salomon Igel [sic], 'O przedmiotach zastępczych' [On substitute objects], *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 32 (1929): 102–21, 206–20.

<sup>30</sup> These are always sensations, although usually sensations and perceptual images based on them.

imaginative act to be able to intend imaginary or reproduced objects it has to apprehend and interpret the complex of the perceptually given sensory contents as the appearance of these objects.<sup>31</sup> This applies both to phantom and non-phantom sensory content.

28. I have argued that the contents that present phantoms are given in perception. The same applies to phantoms. Phantoms can, however, also be given in imagination. When, for example, a painter paints a landscape, he reproduces both the places illuminated by the sun as well as those that are in the shade, and he therefore also paints phantoms. When we look at the painting, these phantoms are given in imagination. In imaginary representation (in the strict sense) they are quasi-phantoms, just as imaginary apples are quasi-apples. Phantoms can – irrespective of the kind of imaginary representation by which they are given to us – be presented by both phantom and non-phantom presenting content. The framework of this essay does not allow me a more detailed description of these facts, particularly since this would require, in reference to one of these claims, a differentiation of the various attitudes towards the world around us.

29. A question arises about which properties form the non-phantom sensory content. Undoubtedly not those belonging to reproduced objects, but rather the properties of reproducing ones. These include objects such as a canvas covered with pigment, marble shaped in a certain way, and actors on the stage. But the imaginative intention is not directed at them as the closest objects of the presenting content, its proper objects. It bypasses, overlooks, the objects proper, the ones closest to the presenting content, for which the presenting content is the adequate one, and is directed at further objects to which the presenting content is only quasi-adequate. It is not Solski crying and falling on the stage, but Molière's miser;<sup>32</sup> what is blue is not the upper part of the canvas framed and behind glass, but the sky. If the presenting content consists of contents presenting phantoms, their proper, closest objects are phantoms, since phantoms as such can become objects of separate representational acts. Imaginary representation, however, aims through content presenting phantoms at objects farther away, for which the presenting content is a quasi-adequate content. Both imaginary and reproduced objects can be those objects farther from presenting content of imaginary representation only quasi-represented by it.

<sup>31</sup> In the natural attitude, this complex of sensory contents is apprehended and interpreted as the appearance of the perceived reproducing object and, moreover, as the adequate appearance. Playing the role of an appearance of an imaginary object, or a reproduced one, the complex is a quasi-adequate appearance.

<sup>32</sup> [Ludwik Solski (1855–1954) was a Polish stage actor and theatre director.]

30. The presenting content of imaginary representations – delivered to them by the perceptual acts which are their basis – performs the function of the appearance of the imaginary or reproduced object. Having proposed that the two kinds of appearances of imaginary representations are the static and the dynamic, I shall now try to describe the difference between them in more detail. At first it seems that the static appearance consists of one appearance, but the dynamic appearance consists of a continuum of appearances. The following statement therefore comes to mind: only those imaginary representations which are presented to me by the variety of appearances have a dynamic appearance. But that requires qualification. This statement does not apply to sculptures. Nor are there appearances that are purely static, because every non-phantom presenting content, that is, one not playing the role of a phantom appearance, is covered with a layer of phantom sensory content. The painting at the exhibition is sometimes illuminated by the sun and sometimes in shadow. The phantom layer on the surface of the canvas is of course continuously changing, which causes a certain changeability of the presenting content limited mostly to changes in colour, and therefore changes in static appearance. I do not believe, however, that that makes the difference between static and dynamic appearances groundless. This also applies to other qualifications, that is, the fact that getting closer to, or farther from, the painting or sculpture causes a continuum of appearances. They differ in size, but reveal no new side of the object or its background. Nor can they present it in motion. Nevertheless, this statement requires the following modification: we will state that only those imaginary representations whose objects are presented from different sides and in motion through many appearances are dynamic, whereas the others are static. By emphasizing the moment of motion, the categories of the static and the dynamic are now transposed to the reproducing object and their relation to appearance is derived from whether the proper object, closest to the presenting content, is static or dynamic.

31. The second question concerns the relation of the static appearance to the imaginary or the reproduced object. Static appearance only presents one side of an object, leaving me to imagine the other sides as I please. Let us return to the house in our description. On the side that I can perceive, it has three floors and a red roof. Two walls meet in an obtuse angle towards the inside of the house. And perhaps it is this last detail that prompts me to apprehend it as having four walls and a roof also on the side that I cannot see. But what kind of roof? Is it also red or is it perhaps green or blue? I can present to myself these properties however I please, and thus create a whole array of objects that I can intend. The roof of one will be only red, of another, red and green, and of yet

another, red and blue, and so forth. It would thus seem that by means of static appearance I can intend a whole array of imaginary or reproduced objects. I believe this statement is false. The appearance unambiguously determines for me the imaginary or reproduced object. It allows me to intend it as the three-floor red-roof side that I can perceive, and so forth; moreover, it demands supplementing the side I cannot see. There is something in it that makes me see it as a solid and not as a decoration composed of two canvases. But the kind of solid it is, whether it has two walls or three, whether the roof on the other side is red or perhaps green, these are aspects not determined by appearance. If, however, I still supplement the object of my intention by attributing to it a roof of a certain colour, it would seem that I have abandoned the sphere of imaginary representations and have turned to reproductive, creative images or concepts for help. The intentional object of imaginary representation is unambiguously determined by its appearance, and is unique. There are as many objects common to imaginary and secondary representations, as well as to concepts, as there are possible combinations of the same imaginary object with various secondary images and concepts.

32. Lastly, we should consider the question of whether the imaginary representation is not an illusion, since this question is closely linked to the problem of the relationship between the presenting content and the presented object, that is, imaginary or reproduced. The idea that it is a kind of illusion can come to mind because there is a kind of illusion in which I refer the appearance, or the presenting content playing the role of appearance, to the improper object of presenting content instead of the proper object. I notice an acquaintance in the street. After a while I realize that he is a stranger. I still see the same coat, hat, way of walking, and so forth, but now I refer him to a proper object of presenting content instead of the previous improper one. This kind of illusion (delusion) and imaginary representation are both intentions directed at the improper object of the presenting content. Yet, imaginary representation is not a kind of illusion, since with an illusion I am convinced in my perception that this appearance is the appearance of my acquaintance, whereas with an imaginary representation there is no such conviction. Where there is such a conviction and consequently an illusion, I simply do not represent imaginatively. Thus imaginary representation is more similar to exposed delusion, disillusioned illusion, but even this analogy is flawed. The exposed illusion that lacks conviction has to be preceded by illusion with this conviction, whereas imaginary representation was never accompanied by such a conviction. It would be more plausible to say that after exposing the illusion I can experience imaginary representations. I know that it is a stranger and not an acquaintance that is walking in front of me.

I am curious how this illusion happened. Through the given appearance I intend my acquaintance, I examine the adequacy of presenting content to the presented object while being aware that the proper object of presenting content is the stranger. I represent to myself the acquaintance in my imagination. Just as in the theatre we are sure that actors exist but not Hamlet, Kordian,<sup>33</sup> or Faust. I claim that the belief that one experiences illusion in the theatre is false.<sup>34</sup> If the audience were really under the influence of an illusion by the end of *The Curse*<sup>35</sup> they would go running for their umbrellas in view of the approaching storm, and Othello would not kill Desdemona, because the spectators would expose the deceit of a vicious subordinate.<sup>36</sup> What we experience in the theatre is imaginary representations,<sup>37</sup> but our attitude can change at any given moment and focus on observing the actor (the reproducing object), which always happens with bad acting.

What I have said is consistent with Meinong's observation in *Über Annahmen*<sup>38</sup> that the spectator in the theatre does not believe but assumes. If he were not imaginatively to represent, but were instead under the spell of illusion, he would not pronounce assumptions but judgements. Consequently, together with an analysis of assumption, the analysis of imaginary representations is a necessary condition for understanding the psychology of the spectator in the cinema or the theatre.

Returning to the question of the difference between imaginary representations and a certain kind of illusion, this difference may also be demonstrated in other ways. The objects of imaginary representation are apprehended as quasi-temporal and quasi-spatial, which cannot be said about unexposed illusions. Illusions can also occur when I intend a reproduced object or an imaginary one but to which I attribute properties of the *reproducing* object (for example,

---

<sup>33</sup> [Kordian is the eponymous hero of a play (1834) by the Romantic poet Juliusz Słowacki (1809–1849).]

<sup>34</sup> There is no illusion in other instances either, in which imaginary representations are involved, for example, when looking in the mirror.

<sup>35</sup> [*Kłątwa* (1899), a play by Stanisław Wyspiański (1869–1907).]

<sup>36</sup> Imaginary representations in the strict sense do not prompt us to action and cannot be the psychological basis of decision-making. Imaginary representations of reproduced objects perform this function very rarely, in exceptional situations, such as when I see in the mirror that someone has entered the room and then turn to this person.

<sup>37</sup> A description of imaginary representations is not a description of the whole stream of the experience of the spectator in the theatre, but of only some fundamental components of this stream.

<sup>38</sup> [Alexius Meinong, *Über Annahmen*, 2nd ed. (1910), in *Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 4, ed. Rudolf Haller and Rudolf Kindinge (Graz: ADVA, 1972), xv–xxv, 1–384. Eng. trans.: Alexius Meinong, *On Assumptions*, trans. James Heanue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).]

I apprehend a statue as marble of a certain shape). Such illusions may have occurred to the religious Greek if he thought that by being in a temple he was closer to Zeus than when he was outside it, if he thought that he was standing *before* a god.<sup>39</sup>

Translated by Monika Bokinieć

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

- Błachowski, Stefan. *Nastawienia i postrzeżenia* [Attitudes and perceptions]. Lvov: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, 1917.
- Blaustein, Leopold. *Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia* [Husserl's theory of the act, the content, and the object of representation]. Lvov: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1928.
- '. 'Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii' [Towards a critical assessment of phenomenology]. *Ruch Filozoficzny* 11 (1928/9): 164–66.
- Brentano, Franz. *Versuch über die Erkenntnis*. Edited by Alfred Kastil. Leipzig: Meiner, 1929.
- Cornelius, Hans. *Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1897.
- Husserl, Edmund. *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 3.1, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Vol. 1, *Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. 1913. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976.
- '. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Philosophy and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book*. Translated by Fred Kersten. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982.
- '. 'V. Über intentionale Erlebnisse und ihre "Inhalte".' In *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 19.2, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 2:352–532. 1921. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984.
- '. 'Investigation V: On Intentional Experiences and their "Contents".' In *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, translated by John N. Findlay, 77–176. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Igiel [Igel], Salomon. 'O przedmiotach zastępczych' [On substitute objects]. *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 32 (1929): 102–21, 206–20.
- Ingarden, Roman. 'Essentielle Fragen: Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Wesens.' *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und fenomenologische Forschung* 7 (1925): 125–304.
- Kastil, Alfred. *Studien zur neueren Erkenntnistheorie*. Halle: Niemeyer, 1909.
- Kreibitz, Josef Klemens. *Die intellektuellen Funktionen*. Vienna: Hölder, 1909.
- Lange, Konrad von. *Das Wesen der Kunst: Grundzüge einer realistischen Kunstlehre*. Vol. 1. Berlin: Grote, 1901.
- Linke, Paul F. *Die phänomenale Sphäre und das reale Bewusstsein*. Halle: Niemeyer, 1912.
- Lipps, Theodor. *Inhalt und Gegenstand: Psychologie und Logik*. Sitzungsberichte der philosophischen-philologischen und der historischen Klasse der Königlichen Bayerischen Akademie 4. Munich: Königl. Akademie, 1905.
- '. *Leitfaden der Psychologie*. 2nd ed. Leipzig: Engelmann, 1906.
- '. 'Bewusstsein und Gegenstände.' In *Psychologische Untersuchungen*, vol. 1, edited by Theodor Lipps, 1–204. Leipzig: Engelmann, 1907.

<sup>39</sup> In imaginary representation a whole array of various illusions is possible. For example, I can apprehend a painted object as a sculpted one.

- Marty, Anton. *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*. Halle: Niemeyer, 1908.
- Meinong, Alexius. *Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe*. Vol. 3. Edited by Rudolf Haller and Rudolf Kindinge. Graz: ADVA, 1968.
- , *Über emotionale Präsentation*. 1917. In *Meinong Gesamtausgabe*, 3:283–467.
- , *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Wert-Theorie*. 1894. In *Meinong Gesamtausgabe*, 3:1–244.
- , 'Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung.' 1899. In *Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, edited by Rudolf Haller and Rudolf Kindinge, 377–480. Graz: ADVA, 1969.
- , *On Emotional Presentation*. Translated by Marie-Luise Schubert Kalsi. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972.
- , *Über Annahmen*. 2nd ed. 1910. In *Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 4, edited by Rudolf Haller and Rudolf Kindinge, xv–xxv, 1–384. Graz: ADVA, 1972.
- , *On Assumptions*. Translated by James Heanue. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- , 'On Objects of Higher Order and Their Relationship to Internal Perception.' Translated by Marie-Louise Schubert Kalsi. In *Alexius Meinong on Objects of Higher Order and Husserl's Phenomenology*, by Marie-Louise Schubert Kalsi, 137–208. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978.
- Pfänder, Adolf. 'Logik.' *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und fenomenologische Forschung* 4 (1921): 139–494.
- , *Logic*. Translated by Donald Ferrari. Frankfurt am Main: Ontos, 2009.
- Stumpf, Carl. *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*. Berlin: Königl. Akademie, 1907.
- , *Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften*. Berlin: Königl. Akademie, 1907.
- Twardowski, Kasimir. *On the Content and Object of Presentations: A Psychological Investigation*. Translated by Reinhardt Grossmann. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977.
- , *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen: Eine psychologische Untersuchung*. 1894. Reprint, Munich: Philosophia, 1983.
- Twardowski, Kazimierz. 'W sprawie klasyfikacji uczuć' [On the classification of feelings]. In *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne* [Philosophical treatises and articles], 411–13. Lvov: PWN, 1927.
- Witasek, Stephan. *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik*. Leipzig: Barth, 1904.
- Witwicki, Władysław. *Psychologia do użytku słuchaczy wyższych szkół naukowych* [Psychology for university students]. Vol. 1. Lvov: Ossolineum, 1925.

## LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN: THE ROLE OF PERCEPTION IN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

---

The analysis of aesthetic experience demonstrates that its central point is a strongly emotionally tinged perception of the object of experience. This perception and the emotions connected to it are the fundamental components of aesthetic experience, which itself is an experiential unity of a higher order, whereas judgements and experiences involving volition – if they appear at all in the aesthetic experience – are of secondary importance. This essay seeks to describe, at least in part, aesthetic experience by means of distinguishing the main kinds of perception occurring in aesthetic experience and shedding some light on the role they play in it. It may be useful in view of the gap that appeared in the research where psychology and aesthetics meet, where scholars have focused solely on questions of aesthetic emotions and judgements. Moreover, distinguishing various kinds of perception may enable us to clarify some controversial matters, such as the problem of apprehending the object of aesthetic experience as real or the possibility of the occurrence of aesthetic emotion based on non-intuitive perception. As it turns out, statements that seem questionable when applied to all aesthetic experiences can be sustained when limited to aesthetic experiences based on particular kinds of perception. The differences in the main kinds of perception consist in how they take place and their emotional content. We will only briefly touch upon the former, focusing instead on the latter.

Perception that is a part of aesthetic experience can be either punctual or lasting. Static objects, such as paintings or sculptures, can serve as objects of punctual perceptual acts and of long contemplation by an educated viewer who can grasp them at a glance or look at them part by part, closely or from a distance, from the side or the front, who can repeat his perceptions, which are the source of emotions, and observe the object in contemplation consisting in sustained perception filled with delight, and so forth. The dynamic, temporally organized objects of aesthetic experience, such as musical compositions, necessarily need long-lasting perceptual processes. The perception of an object such as a work of literature or a theatrical performance consists in gradual apprehension of the object, as it runs its course, in the subsequent perception of its consecutive components while simultaneously grasping the overall structure. The individual

---

This paper was originally presented at the Third Polish Congress of Philosophy in Kraków (1936). [Published as 'Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym', *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 40 (1937): 399–408, reprinted in Leopold Blaustein, *Wybór pism estetycznych* [Selected essays on aesthetics], ed. Zofia Rozińska (Kraków: Universitas, 2005), 136–44.]

components of these dynamic objects, however, can, and often cannot but, be given in punctual perception (for example, in film or radio drama), and so we cannot remain contemplatively perceiving them. Often there is a cinematic image or musical motif that we would wish to perceive longer, but it passes like a snapshot the moment it fulfils its role in the constitution of a temporally organized aesthetic object. There is often also an opposite tendency, rooted in suspense, such as interest in a faster course of events, finally to get to know the whole object. Usually, however, the unrealized need to prolong the perception of the components is transposed to the whole perception of the work in the form of a desire to perceive the object of experience as long as possible. If perception is long lasting, other elements of aesthetic experience also lose their punctuality: in such cases emotion consists in prolonged delight in the object, while judgements concerning, for example, the artistic intentions of the artist, meaning, and the values of the work, are made in the long-lasting mental processes.

Depending on the object of aesthetic experience the perception consists of one of the following: (i) observations; (ii) observations and imaginary representations based on these observations; or (iii) observations and signitive representations. We can therefore speak of observative, imaginative, and signitive perception. In several works I have endeavoured to describe the main differences among them, so here I will restrict myself to a brief reminder of details important for our further considerations. In observative perception the objects given in aesthetic experience include phenomena of nature, products of design, architecture, non-representational visual arts, and most musical compositions. In imaginative and signitive perception what is given along with the perceived object is the object which is presented indirectly, that is, imaginarily or signitively. The perceived object plays the role of the representing object, whereas the object presented imaginarily or signitively plays the role of the represented object. In such cases we are therefore dealing with psychological representation. Objects given in imaginative perception are paintings, sculptures (with the exception of non-representational visual arts), artistic photographs, and partly theatrical pieces and films. In imaginative perception we can distinguish between the presenting object (such as a canvas covered with pigment, a screen filled with phantoms of light, actor's bodies and so forth), the imaginary object (for example, Caesar talking to Cleopatra) and the reproduced one (for example, the Caesar that lived ages ago). In signitive perception what is given is mostly literature and to some extent radio drama.<sup>1</sup> In signitive perception we can

---

<sup>1</sup> After the presentation of this paper Professor Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz rightly pointed out that if the notion of imaginary representation were extended, it would support the claim that radio drama is also given in imaginative perception.

distinguish the presenting objects, consisting of words, whether seen or heard, from either the signified objects or represented objects in Professor Roman Ingarden's terms, or designata in Stanisław Ossowski's terms.

The role of perception in aesthetic experience can manifest itself in three forms: (i) as influencing the emotional component of aesthetic experience, (ii) as influencing the relation of the experiencing person to the experienced object, and (iii) as influencing the constitution of the object of aesthetic experience. Let us start with the first.

The influence of perception on aesthetic experience can manifest itself, for example, as the influence on the quantity and quality of all elements of aesthetic experience. It is relevant to aesthetic experience whether the object is given intuitively as in observative and imaginative perception, or not intuitively, as in signitive perception, whether it is given directly, as in observative perception, or indirectly or by means of the appearance of other objects, as in imaginative and signitive perception. Indeed, differences in emotions follow from this as well. In aesthetic experiences of observative perception the only source of aesthetic feeling is the perceived object and its appearances, whereas when it comes to imaginative perception, the aesthetic qualities of the presenting object are not the sole source of aesthetic feeling. Not only symphonies of shapes, colours, and lights or aesthetic qualities of actors performing on the stage, but also imaginary or reproduced objects, imaginary landscapes, human characters, and so forth, are sources of aesthetic feeling. In signitive perceptions the sources of aesthetic feeling are even more numerous. The sound qualities of words and sentences are supplemented with the qualities of layers of meaning as well as layers of the signified objects and their appearances, as Professor Ingarden demonstrated in his analysis of the literary work of art.<sup>2</sup> There is, nonetheless, an essential difference between imaginative and signitive perception, which is often overlooked by authors who study the 'representational arts' as a single field. The relationship between the presenting object and the imaginary or reproduced one is a relationship of natural representation, that is, one that recreates intuitively and based on similarity, whereas the relation of the word to the signified object is a relation of conventional representation. Thus aesthetic qualities of the presenting object influence qualities of the imaginary or reproduced object, for example, the beauty of an actress influences the beauty of the character she plays, the beauty of the paint on the canvas influences the beauty of the colours of the landscape 'on' the painting. But the sound

<sup>2</sup> [Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, trans. George G. Grabowicz (1931; Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Originally published as *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1931).]

qualities of words have no influence on the aesthetic qualities of the world of intentional objects. In both cases – imaginative perception and signitive perception – there is a ‘polyphony’ of aesthetic qualities, if I may borrow Professor Ingarden’s expression, but in imaginative perception qualities are ‘sounding together’, whereas in signitive perception they are rather ‘sounding in sequence’, since here the distinctiveness of perceptible layers is clearer. Perceptions also considerably influence the secondary components of aesthetic experience – namely, judgements and volitional experiences. What occurs in imaginative perception in the attitude towards imaginary objects and in signitive perception in the attitude towards fictional objects is presuppositions, or, to use Professor Ingarden’s terms, quasi-judgements. What occurs in observative perception, and also in imaginary and signitive perceptions in the attitude towards real world is, by contrast, beliefs and also often ‘peripheral wishes’ (such as the wish to visit the countries seen on the cinema screen). The kind of perception therefore influences the components of aesthetic experience.

The kind of perception is also relevant to the second matter we discussed – namely, the relation of the experiencing person to the experienced object. In observative perception the experiencing person occupies the position of the observer, that is, he or she maintains a distance and a passive attitude towards the object, while being aware that the object and the subject of experience belong to the same spatiotemporal world. In imaginary perception there occurs – as I have tried to show elsewhere – the projection of ‘I’ onto the imaginary world with an awareness of the difference between the world of the experiencing subject and the object of experience. The imaginary world is not in the same time or in the same space as the perceiver’s world. An analogical situation partly applies to signitive perception, as Professor Ingarden has argued in his analysis of the layers of objects of a literary work of art. Some believe that this awareness of a different world of the object of experience, a sense that it does not belong to the spatiotemporal world around the experiencing subject, also occurs in aesthetic experience based on observative perception, such as looking at beautiful winter scenery. In support of this belief they evoke the fact that the object of aesthetic experience is isolated from its surrounding. Undoubtedly such isolation takes place. We isolate the object of aesthetic experience from its surroundings, sometimes isolating it together with its immediate surroundings from the background, because we need the immediate surroundings to emphasize certain aesthetic qualities of the main object. Besides, an object isolated for the purpose of aesthetic experience can occupy the whole view and even the whole horizon, that is, the complex of possible views from the given point, for example, in a view from a mountain top or a church tower. Nevertheless, even in those

two instances we can legitimately speak of isolation from the rest of the surrounding world. Yet, despite this isolation, the experiencing subject does not have a feeling of being in a different world, but rather of belonging to the same spatiotemporal world as the object of aesthetic experience. A fragment of it is isolated from this world, but still remains a part of it. The admired mountain range is in front of me, that is, my body as the aesthetically experiencing person; its top is further than the forest at its base, and the distance is estimated from my real body, not from the body projected onto some imaginary world, as happens with paintings, films, or theatrical performances.

Another related matter is the question of approaching the object of aesthetic experience as something real. Contrary to the popular belief that we do not apprehend the object of aesthetic experience as real, I claim that this only applies to imaginative perception in the attitude towards the imaginary world and to signitive perception in the attitude towards the fictional world. In observative perception I apprehend the object of aesthetic experience as real, and the same applies to imaginative and signitive perception in the attitude towards reproduced objects, with one qualification: in the last two I do not apprehend it as existing here and now. It is not supposed to imply that existential judgement is part of the perception of the mountain, which at this moment I find aesthetically delightful. There is no such judgement in any concrete observation of a concrete object, but any of my observations is accompanied by *eine Wirklichkeitssetzung der Welt*, as the Germans say, an attitude towards the world around me as being real. The neutralization of the attitude accepting the existence of the world virtually never happens, but this attitude does not apply to fictional and imaginary objects felt as not belonging to the surrounding world accepted as real. For example, in imaginative perception we do not apprehend imaginary objects as real, but we do feel the presenting objects as being real. And when the perceived town hall or island in the sea is the object of aesthetic experience, I feel these objects to be part of the real world around me. The source of the contrary and, I believe, false view is, among other things, when one infers from the fact that it is irrelevant to aesthetic judgement whether the object of judgement is real or not the false conclusion that we do not apprehend the object of aesthetic experience as real. The third matter, the influence that the kind of perception has on the constitution of the object of aesthetic experience, is so multifarious that we must restrict ourselves here to only some examples to show that it exists. In aesthetic experience the object appears as possessing certain properties, and the quantity and quality of properties which reach the consciousness of the experiencing subject depend not only on the objective properties of the object, but also on the course and

kind of perception. Let us begin with the influence of the course of perception. While, for example, perceiving a large but static object the order of the perceived parts, the repeated return to a certain part while paying less attention to the other parts, is not irrelevant to which qualities reach the consciousness of the perceiver and which ones he or she will overlook. And while perceiving a dynamic object, for example, a work of literature, it is very important whether the perceiver is guided by a contemplative desire to find delight in each phase of the work or by the suspense caused by interest in the plot, which leads one to overlook certain qualities of the layers of words and meaning. The aesthetic experience is not therefore merely an emotion that arises from the passive, plainly receptive, perception of an object. It is an experience that actively structures its object. Even in observative perception aesthetic experience is never merely observation plus aesthetic emotion, because aesthetic observation apprehends its object in a special way, focusing primarily on the properties of an object 'accomplished' in appearance, intuitively given. This fact became a starting point for the entirely inaccurate theory that aesthetic attitude is an attitude towards the appearance of an object. Rudolf Odebrecht believed that the difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic observation consists in a change that occurs in the object in aesthetic observation, whereas in non-aesthetic observation it is 'untouchable'. I doubt that the second part of this claim is correct, but the first is undoubtedly accurate.

The dependence of the constitution of the aesthetic object on a particular type of perception requires no further argument, although it could be a topic of extensive analyses. For example, an intuitively given object, as it occurs in observative and imaginative perception, and an object given non-intuitively, as in signitive perception, are constituted in essentially different ways and have aesthetic qualities of a different kind. Sensory qualities, such as colours, sounds, and their various combinations, play the key role in the first case as material for the constitution of an object, while in the second case they play a minor role or none at all, unless attention is focused on the layer of sound creations and not on the world of signified objects as would be natural. This could lead to a belief that denies the third kind of perception distinguished here, a belief that was expressed straightforwardly by, among others, Johannes Volkelt. According to him the parts of the novel that cannot be visualized in fantasy, that is, the abstract parts, should be reduced to a minimum since they are devoid of aesthetic value. Whereas Volkelt believes that concepts have a destructive influence on aesthetic attitude, Theodor A. Meyer claims that the value of poetry lies in destroying the visual and that it therefore requires no help from the imagination. Other authors take more moderate positions. Kaarle S. Laurila, for

example, is willing to agree with Volkelt's stance, with the qualification that it cannot be restricted to visual intuition. Ossowski believes that conceivability is sufficient for descriptions to evoke aesthetic experiences. When pondering this question it should be taken into account that we usually read fast, and such reading, as Max Dessoir emphasizes, is not enough even for partial, schematic perception. Moreover, it is when we read with much suspense, that visualization in fantasy almost never occurs. It cannot legitimately be claimed that during such reading we have no aesthetic experience and it should only be assumed that in perception that is purely signitive that the experiencing subject apprehends *only some*, but not all, aesthetic qualities of the object of experience. The sources of these qualities in signitive perceptions are, as we have seen, many, and for becoming aware of some of them signitive perception, during which understanding of the text occurs, is enough, while becoming aware of others would need additional visualizations in fantasy. In any case, aesthetic experiences based purely on signitive perception are possible and frequent.

Our reflections require further elaboration, if only in the form of a concise description of various additional components of perception. These are principally the subsidiary components of a different type than a given kind of perception. Thus, for example, in observative and in imaginative perceptions signitive perception can also occur, as when film uses inscriptions or, sometimes, human speech, and in signitive perception observative perception can take place while not being the basis of the indirect presentation. For example, while perceiving a radio drama we may notice static and sounds such as a telephone ringing or gusts of wind, which are not the basis of signitive perception. Sometimes we can speak of mixed perception in the sense that the object of experience provokes two kinds of perception as if in turns, for example, observative and imaginative, because it is a something in between a painting, which is devoid of 'meaningful' elements and is perceived directly, and a picture existing in the imagination. To this group belongs, among other things, a non-imaginary composition in which there are certain imaginary elements, such as illustrations combining decorative and imaginary features, or images painted in such a way that the centre of gravity of the aesthetic experiences is clearly shifted towards the presenting object. This occurs, for example, when the outlines of an imaginary object are so unclear that we can only find delight in colours, lines, shapes, and composition, but not in a human figure. Images from memory or fantasies can also occur as additional components of all three kinds of perception, for example while listening to a musical composition. In addition, aesthetic emotions can also be evoked by pure fantasies, but this is a productive aesthetic experience, not a perceptual one, which is why I did not include it earlier. Another possibility is

secondary experiences based on recollections of experiences of primary observative, imaginative, or signitive perception, but a case in which the starting point of aesthetic experience were not primary perception but the recollection of it seems impossible. Based on all these kinds of perception there can occur as its secondary components schematic representations, especially symbolic ones, which become a new source of emotion (as I have endeavoured to argue in a book devoted to these experiences).<sup>3</sup> And lastly, the perception of expressive objects entails 'empathy' or other kinds of observation of the mental experiences of others or of apprehending feelings and moods projected on the animate or inanimate natural world. Empathy, as Müller Freienfels emphasizes, can occur in the attitude of a viewer of, or participant in, an action. Only the experiences of empathy that emerge in the attitude of a viewer are components of perception. Experiences arising within the attitude of a participant are already part of aesthetic emotion.

The modest scope of this essay prevents a more detailed analysis of additional components of perception or reflection on the role of judgements and suppositions as factors aiding perception that occurs in the form of (i) judgements stating what is directly given in perception; (ii) judgements interpreting, for example, the subject matter of a painting, the meaning of a symbol or allegory, the content of programme music; or (iii) judgements in which, according to Mieczysław Wallis, we come to an understanding of artistic intentions in works of art. These aesthetic evaluations analyzed recently by Wallis do not, however, belong to factors aiding perception.

The differences among various kinds of perception seem relevant to the description of the subsequent phases of aesthetic experience, which follow chronologically one after another. The importance of the differences in shedding light on the essence of this experience is emphasized by Professor Ingarden, and each should therefore be described separately. This should enable the discovery of the characteristic features of each of these kinds rather than all of them together, and it may also help to demonstrate the validity of the pluralist approach towards aesthetic values, which is advocated by Professor Tatarkiewicz. Last but not least, the distinction between the fundamental kinds of perception may be useful for differentiating the arts, or rather aesthetic objects in general, in a non-trivial way. Since the kind of perception depends on the type of object of aesthetic experience (and the differences between various kinds of perception are, as we have seen, connected with differences between many other properties

<sup>3</sup> [Leopold Blaustein, *Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne: Badania z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki* [Schematic and symbolic representations: Research on the border of psychology and aesthetics] (Lvov: Przegląd Humanistyczny, 1931).]

of aesthetic experience), there arises a possibility of this division with respect to the kind of experience it evokes.

Along with these more profound consequences I find other claims based on these differences important, in particular: (i) the different character of the polyphony of aesthetic qualities in imaginative perception ('sounding together') as opposed to signitive perception ('sounding in sequence'); (ii) the observative apprehension of a given object of aesthetic experience as real and belonging to the real spatiotemporal world around me; and (iii) the possibility of aesthetic experience based on the signitive perception in which, however, only some kinds of aesthetic quality of the object of aesthetic experience reach the consciousness of the subject of aesthetic experience.

Translated by Monika Bokiniec