

Sebastian Sunday Grève and Jakub Mácha, eds. *Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 314 + xxi pp. ISBN 978-1-137-47253-3

Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language contains eleven essays grouped into five sections, very loosely related by the family resemblance concepts of creativity and/or language. Given the wide range of topics covered in the last three sections, the section headings are a way of making for easy reference within the book rather than a hard and fast means of organizing the contributions themselves. Also, given the very different (and unrelated) subjects dealt with, ranging from Wittgenstein's philosophical style and position on the relationship between language and the world to specialized subjects like Wittgenstein's comments on Gödel's proof and Loos's influence on Wittgenstein, it is unlikely that this book will be read cover to cover by the typical reader. Rather, parts of it will be of interest to the specialist. This is further encouraged by the varying quality of the contributions, with at most only three of them being of very high quality. It is impossible, given the space limitations, to examine carefully all the papers. Instead, I'll focus on what struck me as particularly good or bad about these contributions.

The introductory essay by the editors is one of the weakest parts of the book because it contains a contrived characterization of linguistic creativity in relation to Wittgenstein's philosophy.¹ In the first section, from a list of *highly questionable* claims and conditional statements, the editors present what they take to be 'the paradox of linguistic creativity': the view that creating 'new meanings' is impossible. They think this follows from the view that 'rules are constitutive of meaning', and they quote P. M. S. Hacker as an example of how this view can readily lead to 'misunderstanding' – whether intended or not. Claiming that rules are fundamental to the institution of language, that to know the meaning of an expression is to know its rule-governed use, and that there is no such thing as following a rule one does not know, Hacker concludes that the rules constitutive of the meaning of expressions can't be awaiting discovery.²

¹ The second and fourth sections of the introduction provide, respectively, a brief examination of the literary techniques employed by Wittgenstein and a summary of the papers to follow, both of which are adequate to their purpose. Since the other papers in this collection do not importantly build upon or meaningfully relate to (by, for example, addressing/avoiding the problems of) any of the first three sections of the introduction, the introduction presents itself as just another paper as opposed to a work with a unifying thematic focus.

² Here the editors are quoting from P. M. S. Hacker, 'Wittgenstein and the Autonomy of Humanistic Understanding', in *Wittgenstein, Theory and the Arts*, ed. Richard Allen and Malcolm Turvey (London: Routledge, 2001), 60–61.

According to the editors' understanding of Hacker, this means that there can be no 'new meanings'. But, the authors suggest, it is possible to interpret a poem, and here talk of 'new meanings' of expressions is in order. From this, they conclude, 'clearly, then, there must be something wrong with this talk of meaning and rules' (p. 7). This is a very 'creative' argument, in the pejorative sense the authors outline: that is, used as an ironic criticism (p. 4). Although not carefully explained, their arguments here and earlier (p. 6) trade on the idea that rules can't be spontaneously changed/created, something Wittgenstein and Hacker argue against,³ or that the impossibility of rules awaiting discovery implies that new/alternative rules can't be *learned* (a position clearly not suggested in the cited Hacker paper). Hacker's argument is meant to show that there is no such thing as discovering a rule in the way that discoveries are made in the sciences; it does not prohibit 'discovery' in the sense of learning or interpreting new or different rules (which presupposes the existence of such distinct normative practices).

Various literary techniques are used in literature, only very few of which, it seems to me, would involve 'new meanings'.⁴ But insofar as there are some, they clearly presuppose an understanding of the language being used in the work. Insofar as 'new meanings' are created, it is either by giving a word or sentence a new/additional meaning, or by giving a sign without one meaning. In both cases, it is how the sentence/word is used in the work, and the literary techniques therein employed, which makes this a possibility. And insofar as one *interprets* a literary work (especially poetry), one would seek to explain these meanings using ordinary language (and a few technical terms of literary studies) and justify these explanations using the nuances of the work itself (and there needn't be one obvious or correct answer). That is, to interpret a poem precisely involves the normative resources and methods that characterize humanistic

³ See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 4th ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), § 83.

⁴ This talk of 'new meanings' itself is not clear. Many literary techniques, such as symbolism and hyperbole, clearly don't involve 'new meanings'. Punning either takes advantage of the multiple meanings of a word or the fact that a word sounds like another word (this could be considered an 'additional meaning'). Figurative uses of language mean words/sentences are used in non-standard ways and can have different or additional meanings, although this still importantly presupposes their literal uses (and their literal re-description). More rarely (for example, *some* metaphor), a sentence can only make sense against the background of a particular context, but the understanding of what is meant still presupposes an understanding of the standard uses of the expressions being used. Still more uncommon is the situation where a word or sentence is given a completely different meaning or symbols/collection of symbols are given a meaning (for example, *A Clockwork Orange*), which in both cases is achieved through how the linguistic item is used in the literary work.

understanding (for example, providing explanations of meaning), as opposed to the hypothetico-deductive methods of the sciences. Rather than contradict Hacker's point, this supports it, and any 'misunderstanding' is laboured under and perpetuated by the editors, not Hacker. Thus, Hacker's views are perfectly compatible with a discussion of literary techniques and without much more explanation as to what constitutes a 'linguistic conservative', there is no reason to think Hacker (or any other philosopher) is one. And if the concern is about philosophy's role being to chart the bounds of sense (as it appears to be for another contributor: Hagberg), then it is important to note that this project need not conflict with verbal creativity at all. Fictional stories generally (for example, Kafka's *Metamorphosis*), and especially fairy tales and virtually all science fiction, contain numerous examples of conceptual incoherence.⁵ Nonetheless, that does not prevent them from being entertaining and capturing people's imagination.

Stephen Mulhall's contribution has a strong literary focus. The first part consists of a poetic philosophical analysis of a passage of Austin's *Speech Acts*. The Austin passage outlines a specific use of language that Austin wishes to exclude from his subsequent discussion of speech acts. These are what he refers to as 'etiolations of language', which are the uses of language that happen in unique circumstances – exemplified by recitation, acting, and so forth⁶ – and thereby prevent what would normally be 'performed' by the performative from occurring. Mulhall focuses to a large extent on the nuance of Austin's expression, and the relevant metaphors he employs, in an attempt to gain a greater understanding of the role this specific passage plays in Austin's philosophy of speech acts generally. Mulhall's main conclusion is that the etiolations of language were meant to separate uniquely 'ritualized' uses of language from performatives properly considered, so as to be able to insist on the similarity between performative and constative utterances (and preserve the possibility of giving an account of both in the theory of speech acts). Performatives are not like the etiolations of language, which some might wish to conflate in order then to circumscribe incorrectly the category of 'performative'. In rejecting the idea that performatives are 'highly ritualized', Austin is forced to concede that the etiolations of language are '*peculiarly* ritualized', 'deploying conventions that

⁵ Hagberg uses Kafka's story extensively in his own paper. Hacker notes that the transformation of Gregor Samsa into a beetle transgresses the bounds of sense. See P. M. S. Hacker, 'The Sad and Sorry History of Consciousness: Being, among Other Things, a Challenge to the "Consciousness-Studies Community"', *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 70 (2012): 167. Of course, fantasies involving 'changing bodies' or time travel are just a couple of other examples that involve conceptual incoherence.

⁶ All of the examples Mulhall gives are recitation, quotation, theatre, poetry, and fiction.

are essentially discontinuous with the conventionality of our everyday life with words' (p. 32).

I remain unconvinced by Mulhall's account. He puts a great deal of exegetical pressure on Austin's choice of expressions and metaphors. Austin very briefly discusses the etiolations of language, but it is not evident, from what Austin says – as opposed to what can be read into his choice of expression – that he thought them to be 'peculiarly *ritualized*' (although they are uses that are 'hollow' or 'void'). I would emphasize, given Austin's comments, that *special circumstances* are what is important, and that these themselves may consist of conventions of a fairly *ordinary sort*, which characterize how utterances within these circumstances are to be taken (their 'hollowness'/'voidness'). But one may further distinguish between this 'discontinuity' and the type of discontinuity that arises from deliberately deviating from the conventions of language use itself, as is especially common in poetry and theatre (while less common in recitation or quotation). Only this latter type can really be considered a 'systematized or sustained infelicity of procedure' (p. 34). Of course, this is only a beginning to the distinctions that could be made, but insofar as Mulhall's account depends on not making these distinctions, his account is weakened. While the philosophical results strike me as meagre, clearly the author spent time on the poetic presentation of his paper, the second part of which is devoted entirely to literary criticism.⁷

Alois Pichler's contribution examines Wittgenstein's unique style in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Pichler argues that Wittgenstein's form of writing in the *Investigations* was primarily syncretistic (what he also calls 'criss-cross'). Whereas linear writing is characterized by focusing on a particular topic and deviating from this topic only so far as is necessary to that topic, syncretistic writing is characterized by multiple themes or topics that are partially worked on and then left in order to work on other, perhaps only tangentially, related topics. Linear was the preferred writing strategy of Wittgenstein in *The Brown Book*, and while, as Pichler rightly notes, a variety of strategies were employed even in the *Philosophical Investigations*, the strategy most evident throughout, and the one the others are usually put in the service of, is the 'criss-cross' form. Linear and 'puzzle' writing stand in contrast with 'criss-cross' writing, which does not presuppose a completed 'puzzle'.

⁷ Mulhall ends the first part by examining a passage from *The Tempest*. In the second part he examines William Empson's 'Missing Dates', making use of lines from Friedrich von Logau, Tennyson's *Tithonus*, Ludwig Uhland's 'Count Eberhard's Hawthorn', C. F. Meyer's 'Roman Fountain', as well as the commentary and insights of other authors such as Michael Wood, Christopher Ricks, Wittgenstein (whose work is only briefly used in this context), and Heidegger.

It is evident, as Pichler notes, that there was an important shift in form between *The Brown Book* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. Moreover, it seems right to call this new form a 'criss-cross' one, representing the fact that Wittgenstein traversed a variety of topics, letting his thoughts guide him over a vast terrain of interrelated problems. And it seems right to note that this new writing strategy is connected with the acknowledgment of a certain open-ended nature of the inquiry. Insofar as one is bothered by certain philosophical problems, one will investigate the relevant concepts connected with these problems to the exclusion of others. But I do not see any textual evidence to suggest Wittgenstein gave up on the idea of the possibility of a completed 'puzzle' *in relation to specific purposes*. Wittgenstein has an idea of what would be considered a proper *Übersicht* of the segments of language he is considering and that one can achieve this *Übersicht* to varying degrees of success. Even failing to achieve the perfect clarity of a segment of grammar that would appease Wittgenstein does not diminish in any respect the possibility of perfectly representing these concepts (which, of course, is presupposed in Wittgenstein's own dissatisfaction with his work).⁸

Moreover, it is not clear that linear writing was altogether rejected as a legitimate style of philosophical presentation generally. At least at times, it would appear that Wittgenstein saw the 'criss-cross' form as a result of his limited abilities/interests, which would still suggest that the linear presentation is the ideal.⁹ If we take Wittgenstein at his word,¹⁰ it is clear that the expression of his thought, as he actually engaged in philosophy, can be seen as exhibiting a 'criss-cross' form and that his thinking through philosophical problems was limited in this way. But Wittgenstein does not give a great deal of explanation about what *exactly* prevented him from editing his work into the linear form, and I can see no reason to think that Wittgenstein strictly identified a difference of method (between philosophy and science) with a difference of form of presentation.¹¹ Moreover, the 'criss-cross' form is a very appropriate way of expressing the natural train of thought when engaging in Wittgenstein's method, and thus an excellent pedagogical aid, while, at the same time, not saving readers from thinking for themselves, something Wittgenstein insisted upon.¹²

⁸ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3^e and § 133.

⁹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*, ed. Cora Diamond (Hassock: Harvester, 1976), 44.

¹⁰ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3^e.

¹¹ Some passages that are appealed to by Pichler to support his view about the 'criss-cross' form seem to apply more clearly to the methods of philosophy over the form of presentation.

¹² Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 4^e.

For these reasons, the 'criss-cross' form was a natural choice for the final presentation of the *Philosophical Investigations*, even though, without further evidence, I can see no reason to think that Wittgenstein would have rejected the linear form generally, and clearly some of the best scholarship on the *Investigations* is both linear and serves to illustrate the highly interconnected and comprehensive nature of Wittgenstein's work. While I wasn't wholly convinced by all of Pichler's arguments, his paper is well presented and very interesting.

Wolfgang Kienzler and Sebastian Grève's essay, 'Wittgenstein on Gödelian "Incompleteness", Proofs and Mathematical Practice: Reading *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Part I, Appendix III, Carefully', is one of the strongest in the book, and the title perfectly describes the content of the essay. Having provided a characterization of the standard positions on this topic, those of Shanker, Floyd, and Rodych, the essay then takes as its point of departure Gödel's own understanding of Wittgenstein's comments on his proof. Next, Wittgenstein's intermediate period distinction between 'calculus' and 'prose' is carefully presented and explained to be too simplistic according to Wittgenstein's evolving philosophy of mathematics. This necessary and insightful stage-setting allows them to introduce Wittgenstein's position on the topic, which is supported by a very detailed and scholarly analysis of each section of the relevant appendix (along with references to Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*, Gödel's own comments, and relevant secondary literature).

As Kienzler and Grève explain, Wittgenstein's comments in this appendix make no reference to Gödel's proof itself, with Gödel's name not even appearing in the relevant sections, and thus it is not the technical correctness of the proof that is examined or questioned – Wittgenstein assumed 'complete formal correctness'. (Correspondingly, this paper requires no formal understanding of Gödel's proof in order to be understood, which also makes it apt for this collection.) Rather, the entire discussion aims to try to understand Gödelian *explanations*, a specific example (a statement) of which is typically appealed to in summarizing the result of Gödel's proof (that is, 'there exists a sentence P , which is true but unprovable'), insofar as this can be understood in relation to established mathematical practices. And it is ultimately argued that such a statement must be nonsensical, for, assuming, in line with mathematical practice, that only what is proved is accepted as part of mathematics, P (that is, ' P is unprovable') becomes 'problematic' whether it is proved or not. The details of Appendix III, which spell out the particulars of this dilemma, are expertly handled by the authors. Anyone interested in this topic, or Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics more generally, will want to read this essay.

Danièle Moyal-Sharrock's essay primarily concerns defending the later Wittgenstein from the charge of being a (linguistic) idealist, as this is imputed to him by Bernard Williams.¹³ I do not find Williams's characterization of Wittgenstein's development or his description of Wittgenstein's later position on language convincing. But assuming one thinks (rightly) that language does not correspond to the world and, from this, is inclined to infer that this precludes the possibility of a 'language-independent reality', then Moyal-Sharrock gives a thoughtful response to this claim, although her paper, as far as I could tell, adds little to the already existing literature on the topic.¹⁴

Her account is marred by somewhat idiosyncratic uses of words as well as artificial technical distinctions taken from other authors (which add little, if anything, to the reader's understanding). For example, following Ilham Dilman, Moyal-Sharrock distinguishes between what she calls 'empirical reality' and 'conceptual reality'. Empirical reality, we are told, is the reality of 'particular objects', 'particular events', 'specific empirical regularities', and 'ordinary or empirical concepts' (p. 120). Overlooking the fact that 'empirical *concepts*' are even considered part of empirical reality, and not carefully explained, matters become even more complicated when discussing conceptual reality. This is, we are told, 'the reality of formal concepts or logical categories' (p. 120). There is some ambiguity here as to whether concepts themselves are what is meant (which quite trivially is language itself – not 'dependent on language') or something else. Moyal-Sharrock states: 'And so, where the *empirical* reality of rocks and people is *not* dependent on language, *present-day* burglars and *prehistoric* rocks are; their existence *presupposes* our language; we need the present and the past tense, and the concept of theft, to be able to have such beliefs' (p. 120, her italics). Prehistoric rocks are *not* dependent on language (according to Wittgenstein also). Of course, the label 'prehistoric rock' is part of language, and being able to say that prehistoric rocks exist requires language, but both points certainly don't require the aforementioned distinction. Moreover, even with this distinction, it is left to the reader to determine which sense of 'reality' (for example, 'the world'/'nature', or what is 'dependent on language' / anything that 'exists') is meant throughout. There is more potential for confusion caused by this distinction than what is clarified with its use. These word choices seemed to be made for stylistic reasons, with similar romanticization occurring in the subsequent sections on linguistic creativity.

¹³ Bernard Williams, 'Wittgenstein and Idealism', *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 7 (1973): 76–95.

¹⁴ See P. M. S. Hacker, *Analytical Commentary on the 'Philosophical Investigations'*, vol. 4, *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), chap. 3.

If one ignores some other idiosyncratic uses, Moyal-Sharrock's characterization of the autonomy of grammar seems correct. Her essay concludes with plausible and useful examples of linguistic creativity from literature (Stendhal's use of 'roguishness' and Flaubert's use of 'ennui' in *Madame Bovary*), although, once again, the discussion is impeded by needless technical distinctions (for example, from Merleau-Ponty).

Garry Hagberg's contribution begins by examining *Philosophical Investigations* §1, and brings attention to how the simple picture of the relation between name and object named (and sentence meaning being a concatenation of these names), as this is exemplified by the natural pre-theoretical reflections of the typical thinker, importantly distorts the way language actually functions. Focusing on this general position and related observations, Hagberg is doubtless correct. However, in addition, Hagberg uses this observation to argue against what he calls the 'policing' of the bounds of sense, which he sees as connected to the aforementioned picture, and thus refuted by Wittgenstein's detailed refutation of this picture.¹⁵ An adequate explanation of what 'policing' the bounds of sense means is not provided, although a brief explanation of 'ordinary language philosophy' is made, with the additional qualification that it is an 'anemic caricature' (p. 143). Ultimately Hagberg provides no reason to think that philosophy, conceived as the tribunal of sense on the model of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, need conflict with literary creativity, although we would be remiss to take everything we read in literature as logically possible. This being said, Hagberg does give plausible and very interesting descriptions/explanations of how a new creative style emerges within the visual arts, using the example of aerial perspective in relation to vanishing point perspective (and the paintings referred to are helpfully reprinted in the book: Gustave Caillebotte's *Boulevard Seen from Above* and *Boulevard Haussmann*, Albrecht Dürer's *Draftsman Drawing a Woman*, László Moholy-Nagy's *View from the Berlin Wireless Tower* and *Untitled (Looking Down from the Wireless Tower, Berlin)*, and Umbo's *Sinister Street*).

Like Mulhall's essay, the second half of Charles Altieri's contribution is made up of literary criticism (of William Carlos Williams's 'The Red Wheelbarrow' and Marianne Moore's 'An Egyptian Pulled Glass Bottle in the Shape of a Fish'). Altieri's general philosophical point in the first half is that Wittgenstein's important epistemological distinctions, and elements of his philosophies more generally,

¹⁵ Of course, if one conceives of 'policing' the bounds of sense on the model of the delimiting of sense from nonsense undertaken in the *Tractatus*, then this makes sense of Hagberg's claims (since the arguments he presents are Wittgenstein's responses to misconceptions in the *Tractatus*). The fact that 'policing' is not limited to this is suggested by Hagberg's reference to 'ordinary language philosophy' and his not qualifying his position in this way.

can be seen as an 'important contribution to aesthetics' (p. 177). Avowals, aspect perception, knowledge being possible only where there is the possibility of doubt, logic in the *Tractatus* and *On Certainty*, and 'certainty' and the 'picture of the world' in *On Certainty*, are all topics appealed to, and briefly elucidated, in order to prove his thesis. I would agree that all of the topics show either the limitations, or complete absence, of 'epistemic protocols' or fail to be 'reducible' to scientific causal explanations (for example, aspect perception). While Altieri is quite right to draw parallels between these elements of Wittgenstein's philosophies and the arts, much more could have been done to contrast them in order to indicate what is unique to the arts. This would have also helped to make clearer his semi-technical conceptions of 'display', 'participation', and 'attunement', which, in part because of his style of writing as well as presentation of the paper generally, are very hard to understand.

John Hyman's contribution, a revised version of an earlier publication, is unique in the volume due to its subject matter. In a comment made in 1931, Wittgenstein lists the ten most important influences on his thought. The architect Adolf Loos appears on this list, but has been largely, if not entirely, ignored in the secondary literature. Hyman seeks to fill this lacuna. Hyman's work is divided into three parts: a discussion of Loos's principal ideas, a description of the house Wittgenstein built for his sister and how this related to Loos's own ideas (including a picture of the house), and, finally, an analysis of Loos's influence on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Hyman's essay is carefully researched, very interesting, and will doubtless serve as an important starting point for any future work on this topic.

Maria Balaska examines a kind of experience, its distinctive feature being that it has, as Wittgenstein calls it, 'absolute value'. She uses three examples from Wittgenstein's 'A Lecture on Ethics' (as well as examples from other writers). One is, for example, the experience of wondering at the existence of the world. This is not to wonder at the existence of any *particular fact* that makes up the world (which could be otherwise), but rather to wonder that *there is anything at all*. According to Wittgenstein at the time of writing the aforementioned essay, the verbal expression of such experiences must be nonsense because what is being wondered at could not be otherwise. These experiences, according to Balaska, are nonetheless important ones, and the appropriate response to the realization that language is insufficient for the expression of such experiences – the 'groundlessness of meaning', as she calls it – can lead to important instances of artistic creativity.

The biggest weakness of Balaska's essay is methodological: the entire essay is put in the terms of Wittgenstein's early philosophy with, except for a passing use of the term 'language-games', no consideration made of his later work.

How much of her essay, if anything, thus remains relevant after one considers the evolution of Wittgenstein's thought is not clear. Of course, experiences of the aforementioned sort have doubtless inspired great artistic works. But I think that the later Wittgenstein would have admitted the obvious meaningfulness of the corresponding propositions, considering 'proposition' to be a family resemblance concept and thus not being subject to the bipolarity restriction in his earlier work. Indeed, numerous (seemingly meaningful) explanations of these propositions are given in Balaska's essay itself. At the very least, Balaska should have anticipated this criticism.

Ben Ware begins his contribution by examining Wittgenstein's use of 'seeing', giving a piecemeal analysis of Wittgenstein's uses of this concept throughout his philosophies, but showing little in the way of any distinctively Wittgensteinian use of this concept throughout. The later Wittgenstein's conception of 'seeing' seems largely to overlap with the concept of understanding, and, insofar as it can be given a unique characterization, this seems to involve *essentially* other concepts important to his philosophy, such as 'clarity', 'perspicuity', 'technique', and 'imagination'. Ware's discussion of aspect perception builds on this and is adequate, but, as far as I can tell, adds nothing important to the literature.¹⁶ The weakest part of the discussion is the connection made between aspect perception and ethics/politics. Given the focus on the will in aspect perception, that is, the emphasis on one's voluntarily *trying* to 'see' something differently that may be readily (or commonly) present to sight, one would expect, correspondingly, the focus to be on the individual's reflection on his or her own faults and how to overcome them. Or, with respect to the intersection between politics and ethics, one would expect the focus to be on the importance of understanding the complexities of political policies insofar as this involves accommodating people's diverse interests while maintaining the integrity of society. Indeed, Ware even mentions that Wittgenstein's ethical/political outlook seems to have been largely individualistic in nature (p. 259).¹⁷ Instead, what Ware has in mind is a utopian view that we can, if we try hard enough, imagine a world radically different from the existing one. What is particularly strange about this is

¹⁶ See Severin Schroeder, 'A Tale of Two Problems: Wittgenstein's Discussion of Aspect Perception', in *Mind, Method and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny*, ed. John Cottingham and Peter Hacker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 352–71.

¹⁷ Strangely, Ware does not mention Wittgenstein's sympathy, at least at times, with Stalinist Russia even though this would seem to support his argument. See Rush Rhees, ed., *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 231n3. Perhaps he did not want *this* political system as representative of his position. Of course, as noted by Ware, Wittgenstein also expressed strong individualistic inclinations, further exemplified by his preoccupation, at times, with his own wrongdoings (*ibid.*, 47–52).

that it is arguably very easy to imagine utopias. It is, indeed, a common experience (among the young especially), even though it is typically accompanied by a very dogmatic, single-minded understanding of how to achieve the corresponding utopian goals. Thus, I do not see a strong case for applying Wittgenstein's comments on aspect perception in this way.

The first part of Rupert Read's essay is devoted to an examination of Chomsky's use of 'creativity' as this relates to his project in the philosophy of language. To this end, Read examines a number of comments Wittgenstein makes on the concept of infinity and uses this to establish in what ways languages can rightly or wrongly be considered 'infinite' and 'finite'. I am largely in agreement with this part of the paper, and Read's comments on Chomsky's perverse use of 'creativity' are particularly strong. However, aside from some of the particularities that arise with a difference of thematic focus, Read covers much of the same territory as Baker and Hacker did in *Language, Sense and Nonsense*.¹⁸ Indeed, an analogy involving music (pp. 276–77) to illustrate the 'indeterminate' nature of language (what Hacker and Baker, and Read even at times, calls its being 'open-ended') is, at the very least, anticipated in Baker and Hacker's work.¹⁹ It is especially difficult to make sense of Read's aversion to Hacker's 'linguistic conservatism', given the extent to which his account agrees with Hacker's. And, of course, had Read addressed the particularly relevant existing literature on the topic, he could have ensured he would not only present what was importantly unique to the debate, but he could also have clearly indicated where his views, or methods more generally, differ from Hacker's.

One of the most questionable claims made by Read, and one which informs the latter part of his paper, is that 'metaphysics is merely metaphoric' (p. 295). I do not think metaphors, strictly speaking, play a very large role in the theorizing of metaphysicians at all. As Wittgenstein convincingly argued, there are many *different* temptations or confusions that can lead to metaphysics (including, among others, the desire to apply the methods of science to philosophy, misleading similarities in the forms of expressions, or misleading differences in the forms of expressions). A metaphor may not be recognized as such (for example, 'the brain is a computer'), but typically other confusions would foster

¹⁸ G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, *Language, Sense and Nonsense* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). Everything from arguments against the idea of a sentence that is too long to understand and language being 'infinite' (pp. 305–6 and 365–66, respectively), to arguments against Chomsky's distinction between 'competence' and 'performance' (pp. 281–83), are presented in this book. Given the extensive nature of these criticisms, Read's account, when correct, seems to be, at best, supplemental to Hacker's already damning refutation of much of this project.

¹⁹ They use examples from music and cooking (*ibid.*, 363–64), and, in more detail, painting (pp. 354–56), to illustrate most of the same points as Read.

this failure. It would, in the aforementioned case, be computer terminology, among other things, that could lead to a failure to recognize the metaphor as such. And, as already suggested, there is much metaphysics that has nothing to do with metaphor at all.

This book contains little in the way of any systematic treatment of the topic of Wittgenstein and the creativity of language, but perhaps that isn't surprising. As argued above, the editors' attempt to show that rules are incompatible with linguistic creativity is unconvincing. And it's not clear in what other way linguistic creativity should be the occasion for systematic philosophical work. Nevertheless, some of the papers are excellent and others are at any rate worthwhile or interesting.

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